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PAINFUL DISPARITIES, PAINFUL REALITIES 
 
Amanda C. Pustilnik✝ 
 
Legal doctrines and decisional norms treat chronic claims pain differently than 
other kinds of disability or damages claims because of bias and confusion about 
whether chronic pain is real.  This is law’s painful disparity.  Now, breakthrough 
neuroimaging can make pain visible, shedding light on these mysterious ills.  
Neuroimaging shows these conditions are, as sufferers have known all along, painfully 
real.  This Article is about where law ought to change because of innovations in 
structural and functional imaging of the brain in pain.  It describes cutting-edge 
scientific developments and the impact they should make on evidence law and disability 
law, and, eventually the law’s norms about pain.  It suggests that pain neuroimaging 
will solve current legal problems and also open the door to reconsiderations of law’s 
treatment of other subjective phenomena like mental states and emotions, going to the 
theoretical heart of legal doctrines about body and mind. 
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Pain is a legal, philosophical, and human conundrum.  Pain is at once a physical 
state and an emotional experience, and thus exists at the nexus of body and mind; 
nowhere is the law’s casual dualism between mind and body more uneasily maintained 
than in questions of pain.  Legal rights, proscriptions, and statuses turn on the presence 
or absence of pain, and its amount: Questions involving pain span legal domains from 
tort to torture, from Constitutional law to administrative regulation.  Pain accounts for 
hundreds of billions of dollars of direct economic costs and lost productivity annually 
— and yet, pain is largely invisible, unquantifiable, and often grossly misunderstood, 
leading to unnecessary suffering on the part of people whose pain is not credited and to 
unnecessary expense when the legal and medical systems function inefficiently or the 
wrong claimants are compensated.  
What would the law do differently if it could see pain, as is increasingly possible 
through new neuroimaging technologies?  In some domains, law might not change very 
much at all:  In a prior article, Pain as Fact and Heuristic, I argued that certain legal 
doctrines and statuses that appear to be framed in terms of pain’s presence and amount 
cannot be understood or improved by better measurement of pain.1  Rather, debates 
carried out superficially through competing statements about pain — like what practices 
constitute torture, whether a pre-viable fetus feels pain, or whether certain execution 
protocols violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual 
punishment — are coded conversations about values, and not, as they purport to be, 
about physical facts.  Thus pain imaging and measurement, although fascinating, would 
misdirect rather than illuminate, allowing decision-makers to dodge fundamental 
normative issues about the relationship between citizen and state, person and person.   
In other domains, however, the imaging of pain might change law a great deal.  
Indeed, it ought to change a great deal.  This Article is about where law ought to change 
because of innovations in pain science, brought about primarily through structural and 
functional imaging of the brain in pain.  Structural and functional brain imaging, along 
with other brain- and non-brain based research modalities, have in the last two decades 
                                                
1 Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral 
Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012). 
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fundamentally transformed the way doctors and scientists understand chronic pain.  
From an elusive and speculative condition, often characterized by treating doctors and 
by the legal system as a form of hysteria, malingering, or fraud, researchers and 
clinicians now understand many chronic pain conditions to involve neurological 
signaling disorders or even to constitute brain disorders in their own right.   
Brain science can now begin to show why certain relatively trivial injuries may 
give rise to what looks like “excess” pain, why injuries that have apparently healed may 
result in life-long pain, and why some people develop primary chronic pain disorders in 
the absence of any injury at all.  Structural imaging of the brain in pain shows that 
particular chronic pain conditions result in the reshaping of certain brain structures, with 
the degree of brain difference (or damage) correlating with the amount and duration of 
the sufferer’s pain.  Functional imaging shows reorganization in the brain’s default 
network, how the brain engages in unconscious activity.  Moreover, these observed 
structural and functional changes are explanatory: The regions affected map onto the 
symptomatology that researchers observe and of which patients complain.  Chronic pain 
is, as its sufferers have known all along, painfully real. 
This revolution in brain-pain sciences ought to change the law in at least two 
important areas that are the subject of this Article: disability law and evidence law.  
Chronic pain is the single largest category of disability under the Social Security 
Disability (SSD) regime.2  Yet, the regulations about what constitutes disability are in 
places silent about pain and in other places confoundingly circular.  The Social Security 
Administration recognized these problems and convened a panel of experts in 1984 to 
clarify regulations relating to pain.  The panel issued the recommendation in 1986 that 
the matter required further study, pending improvements in brain and pain sciences.  
And since 1986, there the situation has remained: awaiting study.  Pain science, this 
Article argues, is now sufficiently developed for policymakers and scholars to improve 
the law’s treatment of pain in important ways, including to revise the SSD regime 
relating to chronic pain.   
If the current SSD regulations are lacking, judicial interpretations thereof have 
done little to improve them:  In their efforts to gap-fill, circuit judges in federal courts 
                                                
2 42 U.S.C. § 423 et seq. (2012). 
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across the United States, who hear appeals of administrative disability denials, have 
developed their own interpretations of when chronic pain can and cannot constitute a 
disability.  These standards vary by circuit from under-defined and over-permissive to 
draconian.  The same medical evidence leads to different outcomes based purely on 
where an appeal is taken, violating the principle of horizontal equity.  
Some judicial interpretations of the regulations incorporate a pejorative view of 
the chronic pain claimant as suspect, as not genuinely disabled, as seeking recognition 
for emotional wounds in the guise of physical complaints.  Judges and other 
commentators who hold such views are channeling a deep cultural current, as the 
history of pain in law and medicine is one of doubt about pain’s reality, and of 
construing or constructing the pain sufferer as hysterical.  Although pain always 
necessarily includes an emotional component, the view of the interrelationship between 
pain and emotion that remains current in law is several decades out of step with medical 
and psychiatric understandings of chronic pain.  When apprised of new pain science, 
judges may choose a different approach to these cases:  Circuit court judges are 
uniquely placed to change judicial interpretations of pain-related disability to conform 
with current science, so that disability determinations can be more consistent and more 
fair, even before SSA acts to revise its regulations.   
Chronic pain is also at issue in many litigated matters.  These matters may be 
administrative, as in disability claims, but may also proceed under the auspices of tort 
law, ERISA, or workers’ compensation.  Accordingly, judges  and jurors frequently 
need to evaluate evidence of chronic pain.  Direct evidence relating to a claimant’s 
medical condition is already common in these kinds of proceedings.  This Article argues 
that expert testimony grounded in pain neuroimaging, and neuroimages themselves, 
ought to be admissible for certain limited purposes: To educate judges and jurors about 
the nature of chronic pain conditions and to inform them as to the causes, 
manifestations, and likely prognoses for these conditions.  Educating judges and jurors 
is crucial because of prevalent misunderstandings about these conditions, which can 
distort outcomes in both directions.   
Evidence, although a notionally a rule-based enterprise, is highly normative. 
Determinations about what evidence is relevant and reliable, and thus admissible, take 
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place against background expectations or schemas:  How well does the evidence 
presented match what the decision-makers expect to see and believe to be credible?  
Evidence embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative 
process of judges and juries.  These “soft” aspects of evidence may be more influential 
than the rules themselves in shaping litigation and its outcomes.  Background 
expectations or schemas may be informative; they also may mislead.  In cases involving 
chronic pain, jurors and judges alike may hold mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s 
causes, presentation, and persistence.  Introducing educative evidence about chronic 
pain itself could have an important debiasing role, equivalent to steps some jurisdictions 
have taken to permit expert testimony debunking other common but erroneous beliefs, 
like the now-discredited beliefs about the infallibility of eye-witness identification or 
the relationship between prompt reporting and credibility in sexual assault cases.  
Drawing on narrative theory, evidence theory, and behavioral economic accounts of 
decision-making, this Article recommends ways in which neuroimaging evidence could 
improving accuracy in trials by changing the background or default expectations of 
judges and fact-finders.  Turning to black letter or “hard” aspects of evidence law, this 
Article argues that aggregate pain neuroimaging evidence ought to be admissible under 
the federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes for certain, limited purposes.  
However, decision-makers should not expect claimants to produce brain scans, nor 
should claimants be allowed to do so.  Brain scanning technology is not a fraud-o-meter, 
pain-o-meter, or mind-reading machine, but a tool for increasing understanding about 
these complex phenomena.  
Other areas where law grapples with pain are outside the scope of this Article.  
Tort law doctrines relating to pain and suffering and to the vast and important issue of 
emotional pain may be ripe for reconsideration as well.  These important issues merit 
their own treatment in future work. 
*    *    * 
 Part I of this Article describes the state of the law and legal culture relating to 
chronic pain.  Examining treatises, practice guides, and court opinions, it shows how 
outdated, medically-flawed, and pejorative notions about chronic pain affect legal 
decision-making.  
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 Part II presents current research on chronic pain as a set of neurologically-
involved disorders and discusses how neuroimaging may improve legal understandings 
of chronic pain, as well as diagnosis and treatment.  Focusing on structural and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it surveys the field and incorporates 
information from interviews with leading pain researchers.   
 Parts III and IV turn to the ways in which this new science should change two 
key areas of legal doctrine and practice.  Part III analyzes Social Security Disability 
regulations, showing how current neuroimaging research could resolve significant 
doctrinal and applied problems.  It outlines proposals to reform regulations that define 
when chronic pain constitutes disability, to modify judicial interpretations of the  
regulations, and to educate adjudicators about contemporary pain science.   
Part IV turns to evidence law.  Exploring evidence law theory, it shows how 
narrative expectations, culturally received norms, and cognitive predispositions like 
confirmation bias contribute to poor outcomes for chronic pain claimants, and shows 
how pain neuroimaging could be used to modify decision-makers’ beliefs and 
perceptions.  It then proposes where neuroimaging should, and should not, be 
admissible in cases that involve chronic pain.  This section also emphasizes that 
functional MRI should not currently be admissible to prove or disprove a chronic pain 
condition in any individual case. 
I. THE LAW’S LEGACY NOTIONS OF CHRONIC PAIN 
“[W]hile a ‘fundamental reassessment of chronic pain’ has occurred in the 
scientific literature, this reassessment has gone unnoticed in the law. Until 
courts rethink the prevailing model of pain … its sufferers will remain 
under suspicion as latter-day hysterics and malingerers.” 3 
 
The well-documented but declining historical bias within the medical field4 
                                                
3 Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 288 (2005) (quoting Jean Marx, 
Prolonging the Agony, 305 SCI. 326 (2004)). 
4 See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women in 
the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 23 n.1 (2001) (referencing medical journal articles).  
Initiatives by NIH, the American Society of Pain Medicine, and special provisions under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, among others, aim to combat under treatment of chronic 
pain and stereotypes leading to misdiagnosis. Pub. L. 111–148, § 4305, 124 Stat. 119, 584–87 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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against chronic pain patients remains vital within legal fields. 5   Negative 
characterizations of people with chronic pain permeate legal culture.  While many legal 
actors are sensitive to pain-related issues, a range of legal sources portray such 
claimants as primarily mentally ill, and as unstable, attention-seeking, or outright 
fraudulent.  These characterizations appear in sources ranging from standard treatises to 
statements by administrative law judges to the language and decisional standards in 
published opinions.  This section presents a sample of these antique notions, across 
documents and sources that reflect and construct legal culture or that constitute law in 
themselves.  
A. Treatises, Practice Guides, and Expert Opinions 
Treatises like American Jurisprudence and the ALR are not sources law, yet 
they play an important role as repositories of legal culture and sources of norm 
transmission.  Current editions of these treatises continue to repeat nostrums about 
chronic pain that medically are a half-century or more out of date.  Among the first 
things that Am. Jur. Proof of Facts has to say in its section entitled “Modern 
physiopsychological concepts of pain sensations” is this: “the subconscious needs of the 
plaintiff-patient” can cause him or her to “exaggerate pain,” particularly when 
“motivated by prospects of gain.”6  Chronic pain conditions that do not arise from an 
obvious, ongoing injury may indicate major mental illness, like “schizophrenia,” or just 
indicate that the claimant is plagued by “neuroses.”7  The “emotionally disturbed 
individual” may use complaints of chronic pain as “a call for help,” communicating that 
he or she “feels unloved or abandoned.”8  Frequently, the treatise authoritatively states, 
people who raise legal complaints of chronic pain have the “desire” to be a “victim” and 
“enjoy the presence of chronic pain.”9   
To say, as Am. Jur. does, that a claimant exaggerates her pain for gain is not 
                                                
5 See, e.g., Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain 
Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 495 (2003); Diane Hoffman, Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the 
Use of Opioid Analgesics, in REGIONAL ANESTHESIA & PAIN MEDICINE (Joseph M. Neal & James P. 
Rothwell eds., 2007).  
6 I. Alfred Breckler, Whether a Plaintiff Has Sustained Pain & Suffering, in AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 2D, 
§ 3 (2007). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. § 10. 
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precisely to call her a cheat and a liar; but to ascribe the pain to her “subconscious” 
desire for recognition or her enjoyment of being “a victim” does mark her as at the very 
least untrustworthy — which is critical in legal contests, where credibility is key.10  
Indeed, asserting that chronic pain is a symptom of mental illness creates a presumption 
that a person who complains of chronic pain is mentally ill; mental illnesses can 
undermine credibility because they affect aspects of perception, cognition, and memory.  
Further, in legal matters where causation of pain is at issue, as in tort and workers’ 
compensation, these putative associations between chronic pain and mental illness sever 
the link between the claimant’s pain and the external cause she alleges for it.  The 
problem is not the alleged accident or the injury, but the claimant’s mental state. 
The prominence of these statements about the relationship between mental 
illness and chronic pain is noteworthy, too.  The treatise does not lead with biological 
explanations of pain and then note psychological influences in some cases of mental 
disorder.  Rather, it leads with the psychiatric account.  The message is: Chronic pain is 
most likely a manifestation of major mental illness, or at least a neurotic enjoyment of 
victimhood. 
Practice guides, too, perpetuate the same negative characterizations.  Writing for 
The Social Security Reporter, an important journal of administrative law, an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) who adjudicates disability claims advises other 
adjudicators to consider first the possibility of “converted mental conflict” when 
assessing cases involving chronic pain.11  Whether a claimant suffers from “organic” 
pain versus “psychogenic” pain “should influence adjudication of entitlement quite 
differently.”12  In this judge’s view, psychiatric pain should not be compensable; 
“rewarding” the claimant for the psychiatric condition only perpetuates the person’s 
disability rather than forcing him or her to confront and fix the disability’s emotional 
causes.  
Recognizing that psychogenic pain and non-psychogenic pain can be difficult to 
                                                
10 Id. § 3.   
11 Patrick D. Halligan, Credibility, Chronic Pain, and Converted Mental Conflict: Some Distinctions for 
Adjudicators, 38 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 859, 860 (1993) (Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security 
Administration, serving in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.).  
12 Id. at 859.  
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distinguish, the author provides this surprising guidance for adjudicators:  “Severe and 
persistent pain despite good compliance with pain treatments are [sic] the initial positive 
indicators” of psychogenic pain.13  Seeking treatment from numerous doctors also 
indicates psychogenic (non-organic) pain.14  Poor compliance with treatment or failure 
to seek treatment indicates fraud.15  This creates a perfect Catch-22:  If the claimant is 
treatment-compliant and seeks treatment from many sources, but does not improve, she 
is not mentally, not physically, ill (because otherwise treatment would work).  If she is 
not compliant or does not seek out many avenues of treatment, she is malingering 
(because a person in real pain would seek treatment and comply with it).  And if a 
claimant complies with treatment and does achieve relief, she is not disabled.  
 No adjudicator ought simultaneously to believe that seeking treatment and 
failing to seek treatment signal the same psychiatric disorder.  This is equivalent to 
simultaneously believing p and not-p, the definition of logical contradiction.  So how 
does one make sense of this ALJ’s contention?  The paradox can be resolved in the 
following way:  If treatment-refractory pain is itself a sign of mental illness, then any 
particular behavior — complying with treatment or not complying with treatment — is 
irrelevant to whether the claimants’ pain is “real,” because the very premise is that the 
pain is never real.   
B. Judicial Opinions 
Courts struggle with questions relating to the reality and verifiability of chronic 
pain.  At times, federal district and circuit courts chastise ALJs for denying medically 
well-substantiated disability claims grounded in chronic pain.  At other times, however, 
federal and administrative judges display extreme skepticism about such conditions.  In 
all cases, it is clear that courts would benefit from greater understanding of these 
complicated conditions.  Among other problems, adjudicators may reject chronic pain 
claims that are not supported by X-rays, MRIs, or other similar imaging technologies, 
even though such technologies are often irrelevant to the diagnosis.  They also may 
reject claims because they believe that the individual’s pain is greater than it should be 





given the underlying disease or injury, substituting their own judgment for medical 
evidence.  The common thread among these issues is that of disbelief of the chronic 
pain claimant, even at times in the face of overwhelming corroborating evidence. 
Courts often reject claims of chronic pain that are not supported by visible 
evidence of painful abnormalities, even though the claims are medically well-
substantiated.  In Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security, claimant alleged disability 
due to life-long chronic headaches exacerbated by post-concussion syndrome following 
closed-head trauma sustained in a high-speed car accident.16  She endured dozens of 
hospitalizations, several spinal and brain surgeries, and the implantation of a spinal pain 
modulator.17  She also submitted evidence of some thirty diagnostic tests supporting her 
diagnoses.18  Yet, the ALJ denied her claim, and district court affirmed, with both courts 
noting that Minor did not present MRIs and venograms showing gross brain damage.19  
However, as the appellate court noted, none of the claimant’s conditions could be 
detected with these kinds of tests, a fact to which the agency’s examining expert had 
testified. 20   Similarly, in Ketelboeter v. Astrue, the court rejected the claimant’s 
assertion of severe chronic pain because “X-rays” did not “corroborate[] the claimed 
increase in chest pain that [claimant] reported over time.”21  In cases where the ALJ has 
discounted the medical evidence, the ALJ may also have impermissibly substituted his 
or her judgment for the that of the physicians.   
Judges’ insistence that claimants did not have disabling pain because they had 
no abnormal X-rays or similar imaging shows their search for the smoking gun (a 
bulging aneurism, a crushed pelvis), the visible thing that causes the pain.  This 
manifests an attachment to the superseded peripheral injury model.22  Most chronic pain 
is not caused by an anatomical abnormality, but by a functional neurological 
                                                
16 513 Fed. Appx. 417 (6th Cir. 2013) (reciting history below). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 433 (reversing holdings below). 
20 Id. at 435. 
21 550 F.3d 620, 653 (7th Cir. 2008). 
22 See infra at II.A, discussing peripheral and central models of chronic pain. 
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abnormality.23  Because claimants’ pain cannot be visualized, courts conclude it is not 
real.  Alternatively, these judges’ reasoning could run in the other direction:  They 
presume chronic pain claims are easy to fake or stem from hysteria, so even where 
medical evidence is overwhelming (as with Minor), they credit no claim for which there 
is no photographic evidence. 
Closely related to the objective imaging problem is the problem of “excess 
pain.”  “Excess pain” is a legal term of art that applies to claims in which a decision-
maker concludes the claimant has more pain than is typical for a disease or injury, and 
that the claimed level of pain is not supported by “objective” medical findings (like X-
rays).24  No source defines the ostensibly correct amount of pain for each condition, as 
the SSA recognizes that pain can be subjective and variable.25  Rather, judges are left to 
determine whether claimants’ pain is excessive.  They make this determination based in 
part on medical evidence, but also based on their own judgment, against the background 
of what they know or believe about chronic pain.26  Judges vary tremendously in what 
they consider excessive pain, and so whether they find the complaint credible.  
Garcia v. Colvin illustrates the suspicion and uncertainty related to chronic pain 
that judges characterize as involving “excess” pain.27  In Garcia, a claimant with lupus, 
colitis, a blood disorder, hepatitis C, abdominal hernia, and terminal cirrhosis of the 
liver, who was taken off the transplant list because he was too ill to survive surgery, 
claimed disability based on severe abdominal pain and fatigue related to his 
conditions.28  Garcia’s doctors and an agency-appointed examiner concluded Garcia 
was completely disabled.29   
                                                
23 Id. 
24 Ann K. Wooster, Standard and Sufficiency of Evidence When Evaluating Severity of Claimant's Pain in 
Social Security Disability Case Under § 3(a)(1) of Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A), 165 A.L.R. FED. 203, § 3 (2000) (defining “excess pain” as “pain not 
supported by objective medical findings,” such as x-ray).  See Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (defining “excess pain”; holding “Secretary is free to disbelieve that testimony [of excess pain] 
but must make specific findings justifying that decision”) (internal citation omitted). 
25 Social Security Ruling 88-13, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Pain and Other Symptoms (1988). 
26 Wooster, supra note 24 at § 3, describing judicial process. 
27 741 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013). 
28 Id. at 759. 
29 Id. 
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Yet, an ALJ determined Garcia’s conditions did not support the level of pain he 
alleged, and that his complaints of “excess pain” were “not credible.”30  The ALJ 
concluded Garcia’s pain could not be severe because he could “rise to a standing 
position, stoop, squat, and even walk heel to toe” in a brief examination.31  “[T]hese 
competences,” he found, were “‘inconsistent with a finding of disability.’”32  The 
district court affirmed.33  Essentially, the lower courts held that the claimant could not 
be disabled by pain related to his terminal medical conditions unless he was unable to 
move.  They expressly discredited even the agency examiner as likely sympathetic to 
him.34  They similarly dismissed Garcia’s partner’s testimony that he frequently awoke 
at night crying from pain.35  The administrative court concluded that claimant “must 
have been exaggerating” because he delayed seeking treatment;36 however, the record 
showed he sought treatment as soon as he secured health insurance.37 
On review, the appellate court described itself as “astonished” at the lower 
courts’ determinations38 and “surprised that the Justice Department would defend such a 
denial.”39  Garcia is an extreme case, but not an isolated one.40  It represents a general 
problem:  Many adjudicators doubt the reality of pain, even where the pain arises from 
clear and determinable impairments like Garcia’s.  Pain is even harder to substantiate 
where it is the symptom of a primary pain condition.  Claims of “excess pain” invite 
decision-makers to decide how much pain is legitimate; the decision-maker may then 
discount evidence inconsistent with his or her beliefs about pain and pain claimants, 
                                                
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 761. 
32 Id. at 761. 
33 Id. (citing district court opinion). 
34 Id. at 762. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (emphasis in original).  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 763. 
40 See, e.g., Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s conclusion claimant 
had “excess” pain; noting adjudicator may not substitute own judgment about how much pain is 
appropriate for a particular injury); Shavin v. Com'r of Social Sec. Admin., 488 Fed. Appx. 223 (9th Cir. 
2012); Hawkins v. First Union Corp., 326 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003); Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 
(6th Cir. 2009). 
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leading to disparities among chronic pain claimants and between chronic pain claimants 
and others with different sources of disability. 
Some courts implicitly or directly assert that chronic pain lacks reality, that it is, 
itself, a mental illness.  In Selian v. Astrue, for example, the Second Circuit chastised an 
ALJ for “egregiously” substituting “her own lay opinion in place of medical testimony” 
in discrediting all evidence of a chronic pain condition to hold that the claimant was not 
disabled.41  In other cases, courts have held that chronic pain claims are unusually 
subject to “abuse and malingering,” even where the pain derives from known conditions 
like cancer,42 that chronic pain is a “mental disorder” and so not compensable under 
ERISA,43 and that chronic pain patients with somatic disorder are “flamboyant . . . 
exaggerators” whose pain can only be credited if one believes in a “medical 
fantasyland” where the unreal is magically real.44  
C. The Psychoanalytic Legacy 
The views expressed in treatises, practice guides, and judicial opinions that 
people who complain of chronic pain are malingering or neurotic, or enjoy victimhood, 
do not originate within legal culture.  Such views have been received into legal culture 
from earlier work in medical culture — particularly from psychoanalysis, which, 
ironically, appears to retain more currency in law than in medicine.  Under the 
psychoanalytic view, chronic pain exists because the hysterical subject unconsciously 
produces symptoms as an expression of his or her psychological need.  The subject has 
some emotionally painful conflict that she cannot confront; the repressed conflict 
manifests itself as a physical symptom, through a process called “somatization” 
(literally, embodiment).45   
                                                
41 Selian, 708 F.3d at 419. 
42 Weitzenkamp v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 661 F.3d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing lower 
court).  
43 Lange v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
44 Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 771 (7th Cir. 2004) (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
45 The definition of somatization is itself in a state of some flux and controversy.  The traditional 
definition emphasizes its psychiatric character and the unreliability of people who receive this diagnosis:  
“Somatization disorder is a psychiatric condition marked by multiple medically unexplained physical, or 
somatic, symptoms. … [Patients] often use impressionistic and colorful language to describe their 
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Chronic pain and psychoanalytic theory are intimately linked: Indeed, the famed 
Anna O., the very patient who invented the psychoanalytic “talking cure” in 
collaboration with her doctor Josef Breuer, sought treatment in part to help resolve her 
chronic pain symptoms.46  Breuer and Sigmund Freud made her case the centerpiece of 
their foundational work Studies in Hysteria, tracing her chronic pain to repressed 
psychic conflict.  The Anna O. case also embodies the magic trick of the talking cure: 
Breuer claimed that once Anna O. identified and articulated her emotional conflicts, her 
physical symptoms disappeared.  Breuer’s claim was false: The real patient, named 
Bertha Pappenheim, continued to suffer for many years but ultimately learned to live 
with her pain.  She went on to do important work in spite of great physical pain in 
progressive politics, advocating for greater rights for workers and children.  Few 
remember Bertha Pappenheim, while the literary construction known as Anna O. 
remains famous.   
The legacy of the Anna O. story is the enduring construction of pain 
(particularly female pain) as fantasized and hysterical.  It tells decision-makers to view 
the person who complains of pain as suspect and emotionally disordered, and cautions 
them not to fall into the trap of “rewarding” her by believing the pain is real, as this 
reinforces the “syndrome.”  
While the notion that psychological conflict could produce physical symptoms 
did not originate with Freud and his school, it found its fullest expression and broadest 
acceptance through Freud’s writings.47  Early members of Freud’s school asserted that a 
                                                                                                                                          
symptoms …. While many symptoms resemble those associated with genuine diseases, symptoms 
reported by people with somatization disorder are not.” http://www.minddisorders.com/Py-
Z/Somatization-disorder.html#ixzz2vVhL8JZY (last visited March 3, 2014).  The National Institutes of 
Health offers a more contemporary and less disparaging description of somatization, stating that 
somatization is “a long-term (chronic) condition in which a person has physical symptoms that involve 
more than one part of the body, but no physical cause can be found.”  It describes somatization as 
currently undergoing a reappraisal in which clinicians are identifying disorders of pain perception that 
lead to the diffuse and nonspecific pain claims typical of patients labeled as somatizers. 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000955.htm (last visited March 3, 2014). 
46 Bertha Pappenheim, described as Anna O. in Breuer’s case study, sought treatment with Breuer for 
symptoms including paralysis, head and neck pain, and fugue states.  The case has “bedeviled the history 
of psychoanalysis ever since and been the subject of every conceivable diagnosis.”  Edward Shorter, 
What Was the Matter with Anna O.?, in FREUD UNDER ANALYSIS 23, 24 (Todd DuFresne & Paul Roazen 
eds., 1997).   
47 Describing the hysterical invalid, Freud asserts: “Her state of ill-health will have every appearance of 
being objective and involuntary — the very doctor who treats her will bear witness to that fact; and for 
 16 
patient would convert psychic distress into a bodily ( “somatic”) symptom, relabeling 
what Freud originally called “conversion hysteria.”48  Somatic disorder and conversion 
disorder remain psychiatric diagnoses, although of steeply declining popularity:  The 
DSM-IV-TR cautions that these are uncommon conditions that ought not to be 
diagnosed unless all non-psychiatric medical causes can be ruled out and only where the 
pain symptoms do not follow any known medical criteria.49  This represents a shift from 
DSM-III, which did not express any caveats or cautions; the transition from DSM-III to 
DSM-IV shows the trend in psychiatry and general medicine to resist describing most 
chronic pain as “all in the patient’s head.”50  New neuroimaging technologies now 
enable researchers to understand chronic pain as “in the patient’s head” in a much more 
literal and less dismissive way: As a set of pathologies grounded in central nervous 
system processing, as discussed in the next Part. 
II. CURRENT PAIN SCIENCE AND THE POTENTIAL OF NEUROIMAGING 
A. Chronic Pain: An Overview 
The myriad varieties of physical pain all fall into two categories: Acute or 
chronic.  Acute pain is sudden in onset and relatively brief in duration.51  It follows the 
familiar nociceptive model:  The body experiences an injury or insult (a sprained ankle, 
a burst appendix), nerves in the affected area relay signals to the spinal cord and brain, 
and the brain sends back the message “pain!”  This kind of pain is adaptive:  It signals 
that the organism needs to pay attention to something right now.  Because acute pain is 
caused by peripheral input to the spinal cord and brain, once the peripheral injury 
resolves, the pain goes away.  Most physical pain is acute pain, and most acute pain 
resolves relatively quickly. 
                                                                                                                                          
that reason, she will not need to feel any conscious self-reproaches . . . .” Dora, in VII THE STANDARD 
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, 44–45 (1954–73).  
48 Harold Merskey, The History of Pain and Hysteria, 8 NEUROREHABILITATION 157, 159 (1997) 
(describing history of the term “somatization”).. 
49 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-IV-
TR 446 (4th ed. rev. 2000).  
50 Harold Merskey drove the change from DSM-III to DSM-IV.  See Harold Merskey, Pain Disorder, 
Hysteria or Somatization?, 9 PAIN RES. MGMT. 67, 71 (2004). 
51 K.P. Grichnik & F.M. Ferrante, The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 
217 (1991). 
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Chronic pain is fundamentally different.  Even though chronic pain is defined as 
pain lasting six months or longer, it is not just longer-lasting than acute pain.  Rather, 
chronic pain often has “a life of its own”:  It often does not depend on continued 
peripheral input.  It may endure long after any injury has healed, may be entirely out of 
proportion to the original (sometimes trivial) injury, or may arise in the absence of any 
injury.  
Many severe chronic pain disorders are “primary,” meaning the pain is itself the 
disease; it does not derive from (is not “secondary to”) any other condition or injury.  
Primary chronic pain conditions include some of the most common sources of work 
absenteeism, doctor visits, and general misery:  Chronic lower back pain and headache.  
While some chronic back pain is traceable to mechanical issues like impinged nerves or 
spinal abnormalities, most abnormal findings are merely incidental; correcting bulging 
discs, for example, frequently does nothing to alleviate the pain.52  Similarly, most 
headache conditions are not symptoms of “something else,” like a tumor or vascular 
abnormality.  The abnormality is in the central nervous system — a kind of “always on” 
setting in the brain.   
Other chronic pain syndromes may originate with a peripheral injury, but the 
pain then “chronifies.”  In pain chronification, the peripheral injury heals or appears to 
heal completely but severe pain persists.53  Common forms of chronified post-injury 
pain include post-surgical pain, complex regional pain syndrome, and phantom limb 
pain.  If a patient is fortunate, his or her pain may be amenable to peripheral 
intervention.54  But for the most part, interventions at the location where the person 
experiences the pain make the pain worse, not better, because it is the brain itself that is 
generating the false sensation of local pain.55   
                                                
52 Such pain may be managed or, in some patients, resolved; however, manipulations or interventions in 
the back itself often have no impact on the pain condition. 
53 David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic Approaches to Chronic Pain, 3 
MOLECULAR PAIN art. no. 25, at 2 (2007). 
54 A. Lee Dellon et al., Treatment of the Painful Neuroma by Neuroma Resection and Muscle 
Implantation, 77 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 437 (1986). 
55 See, e.g., Ronald Melzack et al., Central Neuroplasticity and Pathological Pain, 933 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 157, 162–63 (2001)  (discussing denervation hypersensitivity; reporting that surgical nerve 
resection can lead to increased pain due to neuronal activity in the somatosensory system).  Cf. id. at 163–
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Some chronically painful conditions, like irritable bowel syndrome or advanced 
arthritis, are associated with ongoing peripheral disease.  But peripheral input causes 
only part of patients’ pain:  Patients with these conditions develop neurologically 
altered pain perception, leaving them with both peripheral disease and a central pain-
processing disorder.56 
Chronic pain, whether primary or secondary, both causes and results from a 
phenomenon called “central sensitization,” in which the brain reorganizes its upward 
and downward modulation of pain signals.57  Over time, over-activity in these neural 
regions reshapes the brain, a process called “neuroplasticity.”  Chronic pain sufferers 
develop atrophy and hypertrophy in brain regions involved in pain signal transmission 
and in the affective processing of pain.58  The longer a person suffers chronic pain, and 
the more intense the pain, the greater the degree of volume loss (atrophy) is observed in 
these brain regions.  This time-dependent, pain-dependent atrophy leads some 
researchers to speculate that chronic pain is a neurodegenerative disease.59  Although 
the mechanisms underlying pain-related neuroplasticity remain under investigation, 
researchers agree that chronic pain changes the brain and does so progressively over 
time.60 
This model of chronic pain as a central nervous system disorder is quite new.  In 
Kuhnian fashion, it marks a paradigm shift away from the prior peripheral injury 
                                                                                                                                          
67 (noting that improved surgical techniques, including administration of local anesthesia to nerves to be 
resected, may improve such outcomes).  
56 Sean C. Mackey & Fumiko Maeda, Functional Imaging and the Neural Systems of Chronic Pain, 15 
NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 269, 269–70 (2004) (identifying chronic low back pain, irritable bowel 
syndrome, complex regional pain syndrome, and reflex sympathetic dystrophy as having significant 
centralized involvement); see also Stephen E. Gwilym et al., Psychophysical and Functional Imaging 
Evidence Supporting the Presence of Central Sensitization in a Cohort of Osteoarthritis Patients, 61 
ARTHRITIS CARE & RESEARCH 1226 (2009).  
57 Melzack et al., supra note 55, at  (“Chronic pain involves changes in central pain processing mediated 
through mechanisms of neural plasticity and leading to hyperexcitability of central structures.”). 
58 Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain, 137 PAIN  7, 8–9 (2008). 
59 Borsook et al., supra note 53, at 2 (stating that chronic pain “must be considered as a chronic 
degenerative disease … producing an altered brain state,” citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back 
Pain Is Associated with Decreased Pre-frontal and Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCI. 46 
(2004) (hereinafter “Decreased Density”); A. Kuchinad et al., Accelerated Brain Gray Matter Loss in 
Fibromyalgia Patients: Premature Aging of the Brain?, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 15 (2007)).  
60 Melzack et al., supra note 55, at 167–69 (2001). 
 19 
model.61 It is puzzling that the peripheral injury model endured for so long, in light of 
its general failure to explain the distress and match the symptomatology of many forms 
of chronic pain.  It may have been able to endure so long because studies of the central 
nervous system were not developed enough to provide an alternative account for the 
symptoms doctors encountered.  It also may have endured  in part because the theory of 
psychogenic pain, and background norms relating to hysteria, allowed physicians to 
explain away apparently anomalous cases.62  The peripheral injury model required — to 
state the obvious — a causal peripheral injury.  When physicians found no injury or no 
relationship between a peripheral injury and the complained-of pain, they came to the 
(apparently) ineluctable conclusion that the patient’s pain resulted from no physical 
cause.63  This conclusion, in turn, was buttressed by the readily-available theories of 
hysteria and conversion.64  
The contemporary model that gives priority to brain-based processes may not be 
the last word in pain science, and the field continues to evolve; but it has vastly more 
explanatory and predictive power than the prior model.  The sections below detail 
particular neuroimaging technologies and what they currently show (and cannot show) 
about chronic pain conditions. 
B. Structural Neuroimaging Shows Changes in Pain Sufferers’ Brains 
1. Overview of Structural Neuroimaging 
Magnetic resonance imaging generates a three-dimensional, highly detailed 
representation of hard- and soft-tissue bodily structures.65  MR images can show 
whether there are structural abnormalities within the imaged area; many readers will 
have direct experience of this through having had an MRI of the knee or lower back.  
                                                
61 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed. 2012).   
62 See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.  
63 Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral Data, 3 APS 
J. 274, 274 (1994) (describing physician frustration with chronic pain claimants, and their tendency to fall 
back on explanations of somatization and secondary gain, stating, “[t]he concept behind the use of the 
term seemed simple: without a known biomedical cause, the symptom must be psychiatric.”) 
64 See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
65 Despite the verisimilitude of the MR image, unlike a photograph or an X-ray, an MR image is a 
computer-generated composite constructed from data.  DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI FROM 
PICTURE TO PROTON (2007). 
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MR images also show the volume of particular areas, allowing for the volume of the 
same structure to be compared across subjects.   
This volumetric comparison of different brain regions shown on an MRI is 
performed using a mathematical technique known as “voxel-based morphometry,” or 
VBM.  Just as a flat screen is comprised of pixels, locations within the three-
dimensional MR-image space are designated by volumetric pixels, called “voxels.”66  
Standardizing a voxel map over brain images allows researchers to compare the 
volumes of brain regions across subjects or within one subject over time.67   
Studying the shape and size of brain regions — the brain’s “morphometry” — 
using voxel-based comparisons enables a range of studies exploring the impact of 
various conditions on brain size and structure.68  “Neuroplasticity” — the way the brain 
remodels itself response to experience — has practically become a household word over 
the last decade, in part because VBM can now show, noninvasively, how people’s brain 
regions grow, shrink or reorganize.69  
2. Brain-based Changes Reflect Duration, Severity, and Type of Pain  
Three decades ago, Elaine Scarry famously wrote in The Body in Pain that 
“physical pain” seems to have “no reality because it has not yet manifested itself on the 
visible surface of the earth.”70  She described pain’s invisibility as causing it to be “that 
which cannot be denied and [yet] that which cannot be confirmed.”71  Structural 
neuroimaging now shows that distinct chronic pain conditions produce characteristic 
patterns of structural brain alteration, with the degree of visible brain alteration 
correlating with the duration, severity, and kind of chronic pain.  These findings lend 
reality and specificity to chronic pain conditions:  Although the sensation of pain 
remains invisible, pain creates visible traces in the body.  Through these technologies, 
                                                
66 Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869 (2008). 
67 The typical voxel in an MR brain image is about three millimeters on each side, or about nine cubic 
millimeters.  Logothetis, supra note 66. 
68 Arne May, Magnetic Resonance-Based Morphometry: A Window into the Structural Plasticity of the 
Brain, 19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 407, 408–09 (2006).   
69 Id.   
70 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 3–4 (1985). 
71 Id. at 4. 
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pain now is “visible on the surface of the earth”; it is now “that which cannot be denied 
[and] that which cannot can now be confirmed.”72  
 The ground-breaking work that first showed the relationship between chronic 
pain and regional brain atrophy was conducted by Vania Apkarian, a professor of 
neuroscience at Northwestern University.  In 2004, Apkarian showed that chronic back 
pain is associated with decreased grey matter density in the prefrontal cortex and 
thalamus of the brain.73  The core finding of this paper appeared to be: Chronic pain = 
brain loss; more pain = more brain lost.74  
Numerous prominent researchers have confirmed and extended these findings.  
Professor Arne May, one of the world’s leading researchers on the structural 
neuroimaging of headache pain, reports that VBM studies show significant changes in 
grey matter in patients with chronic headache, chronic back pain, and phantom limb 
pain.75  The more grey matter a subject has lost, the more sensitive he or she becomes to 
pain.76  In a meta-review of the burgeoning research on structural pain imaging, May 
reports that chronic pain most frequently leads to atrophy in the frontal lobes, followed 
by atrophy in the cingulate cortex and the insula.77  Similarly, David Boorsook, a 
Harvard-based pain researcher, has reported characteristic structural, functional and 
molecular changes in brain regions in patients with chronic neuropathic pain, complex 
regional pain disorder, and fibromyalgia.78  This ability to determine which parts of the 
brain are compromised by specific chronic pain conditions “revolutionizes therapeutic 
                                                
72 SCARRY, supra note 70, at 4 (alteration and emphasis added).  
73 Apkarian et al., Decreased Density, supra note 59 at 46. 
74 See, e.g., A. Vania Apkarian, Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical 
Chronic Pain, 3 PAIN 162 (2011); David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic 
Approaches to Chronic Pain, 3 Molecular Pain 25, 27 (2007)  (stating chronic pain “must be considered 
as a chronic degenerative disease”).  
75 Arne May, Neuroimaging: Visualizing the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S101 (2007). 
76 Nichole M. Emerson et al., Pain Sensitivity Is Inversely Related to Regional Grey Matter Density in the 
Brain, 155 PAIN 566 (2013).  
77 Arne May Structural Brain Imaging: A Window into Chronic Pain, 17 NEUROSCIENTIST 209, 212 
(2011); see also Arne May, New Insights into Headache: an Update on Functional and Structural 
Imaging Findings, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 199–209 (2009) (reporting volumetric changes in the 
insula, brain stem, and hypothalamus as characteristic of various primary headache syndromes). 
78 Borsook et al., supra note 74 at 29. 
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approaches to chronic pain” by helping achieve diagnostic specificity and pointing 
toward neurological targets for intervention.79 
C. Functional Neuroimaging in Chronic Pain 
 Distinct chronic pain conditions correlate with distinct structural brain changes, 
as described above.  Researchers are exploring whether particular types of chronic pain 
correlate with specific functional patterns of activity in sufferers’ brains.  The answer, 
preliminarily, is yes:  Functional neuroimaging shows that different pain conditions are 
associated with characteristic patterns of brain activity.  This section introduces how 
functional brain imaging works, and then describes how functional imaging studies 
contribute to understanding chronic pain disorders.   
1. Overview of Functional Neuroimaging 
The main technology for imaging the brain in pain is functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI).  This revolutionary technology allows researchers to 
glimpse and approximate in real time the activity of the brain that corresponds to varied 
kinds of action and experience.  Using fMRI, researchers can start to understand which 
regions of the brain are involved in perceiving and experiencing acute pain, and in 
experiencing and generating chronic pain.   
fMRI works by indirectly indicating where the brain is using more energy.80  
The brain is constantly active, and certain regions of the brain preferentially become 
active when a person engages in a particular task or thought process.81  Usually, many 
regions become active together, because the brain is a highly interconnected system.82  
When brain regions become more active, their metabolic demands go up:  They need 
more oxygen and glucose, which are delivered by increased blood flow.  
                                                
79 Id.  
80 See, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the BOLD Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCI. 3963, 3963 (2003). 
81 Id.  
82 John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You Can Stop Using 
Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 650, 651 (2003);  
see also, e.g., Matthew Brett et al., The Problem of Functional Localization in the Human Brain, 3 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 243, 243 (2002) (detailing problems with using fMRI to localize complex 
and interconnected brain functions). 
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When an MRI machine sends magnetic pulses through the subject’s brain, it can 
detect these changes in blood flow.83  The magnetic pulses are not distorted by oxygen-
rich blood, but deoxygenated blood distorts the magnetic wave slightly.84  This creates 
the “Blood Oxygen Level-Dependent,” or BOLD, signal.85  Researchers generate a 
composite picture of which regions in the brain show increased or decreased blood flow 
during a task or experience.86  It is important to understand that fMRI is not a 
photograph of brain activity.  Instead, it is like looking at a map of where a city uses 
energy, which can indicate where the city is bustling and where it is sleepy.   
In investigating acute pain and chronic pain conditions, fMRI has proven 
revelatory.  Irene Tracey, an Oxford University-based scientist, was the first to use 
fMRI to image the brain in pain.  She has shown not only which regions of the brain 
process acute pain, but also that subjective self-reports of acute pain correlate with the 
degree of activity in the subjects’ brains.87  That is, the phenomenology of pain matches 
the physiological degree of response to pain, a fascinating empirical contribution to 
philosophical debates on perception.  Researchers have used fMRI to show functional 
brain reorganization in patients with chronic pain,88 and have even shown that particular 
types of functional reorganization are characteristic of distinct chronic pain 
conditions.89 
fMRI has important limitations, however.  First, it has temporal limitations:  
Blood flow may precede neural activity — or it may lag behind.90  Spatially, the signal 
                                                




86 Id. at 809. 
87 Irene Tracey & Patrick Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and its Modulation, 55 
NEURON 377 (2007). 
88 May, supra note 75, at S104–S105 (showing functional reorganization in headache syndromes and that 
degree of reorganization correlates with degree of pain and impairment).  
89 May, Structural, supra note 77, at 211 (review article reporting functional imaging findings of 
headache syndromes; showing distinct brain regions become active during pain attacks in the various 
syndromes). 
90 Nikos K. Logothetis & Josef Pfeuffer, On the Nature of the BOLD fMRI Contrast Mechanism, 22 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1517, 1524 (2004). 
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from blood vessels may not be precisely where the neural activity is taking place.91  
Third, there is a great deal of normal variation in brain response in a single subject 
(person) across different trials, and lots of variation between subjects.92  An fMRI 
showing the response to a particular stimulus like pain is an average — an average of 
many trials of one subject, and an average of many trials across different subjects.   The 
composite fMRI showing what “the brain” does in response to, say, a painful heat 
stimulus may not look exactly like any single scan of any subject’s brain in that 
experiment.93  
2. fMRI as Objective Measure of Pain? 
When fMRI studies have created a robust composite of average brain activity in 
response to a particular stimulus (say, acute pain), then researchers can use software to 
compare an individual brain scan to the composite and make an educated guess about 
whether the individual is experiencing the same thing. 94   Could fMRI pattern 
classification provide a  “pain-o-meter” to help legal actors improve trial outcomes and 
better manage systems at risk for fraud?   
A team of researchers led by Sean Mackey at Stanford University have 
developed an fMRI protocol that can determine in most cases whether a subject in an 
fMRI scanner is experiencing acute pain.95  In a paper tantalizingly entitled, Towards a 
Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish 
Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, the authors assert that their findings 
demonstrate that fMRI “can assess pain without requiring any communication from the 
person being tested.”96  This work has been refined and extended by Tor Wager, whose 
recent work in the New England Journal of Medicine showed that fMRI could detect 
                                                
91 Id. 
92 Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 275 (2007). 
93 Id. 
94 Justin E. Brown, Neil Chatterjee, Jarred Younger, & Sean Mackey, Toward a Physiology-Based 
Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal 
Stimulation, 6 PLOS ONE e24124, *2 (Sept. 2011) (describing machine learning paradigm).  
95 Id. at *7. 
96 Id. at *1. 
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acute pain in normal, healthy subjects with ninety-five percent accuracy.97 
This major research accomplishment looks like a pain-o-meter, but it is not.98  
Even if this protocol worked perfectly in predicting acute pain (and it currently has a 
relatively high rate of error), it would be of limited use relative to chronic pain, as these 
conditions present very differently neurologically.  Further, acute pain can be produced 
in the lab; chronic pain may or may not be present, and may be present at varying 
intensities, at the time of a test.  Apart from pain detection, though, fMRI can detect 
changes in the “default-mode network,” or patterns of background activity, of chronic 
pain sufferers’ brains.99  This finding helps explain perceptual, cognitive, and affective 
impairments that occur in these conditions.100  Perhaps in the future, fMRI of the default 
network may have diagnostic potential, helping categorize patients, plaintiffs or 
claimants. 
III. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE NORMS AND DOCTRINE IN DISABILITY LAW 
The new science of chronic pain, particularly neuroimaging of chronic pain, 
should lead to modifications to the Social Security Disability regulations and, in the 
near term, to judicial reinterpretation of the existing regulations.  This Part first presents 
the SSDI regulations and the 1984 Amendment to those regulations, which were 
intended to provide adjudicators with greater guidance on how to evaluate claims 
grounded in chronic pain.   
While regulatory reform may proceed slowly, federal judicial interpretation of 
the existing regulations could evolve without delay to incorporate new scientific 
knowledge.  After exploring the regulations, this Section turns to how judges in 
different circuits interpret and apply the SSDI regulations.  Judicial interpretations vary 
considerably from circuit to circuit, incorporating a range of understandings of chronic 
pain, some of which are loose and unbounded, while others are unrealistically narrow 
                                                
97 Tor Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
1388, 1388 (2013). 
98 Brown, supra note 94, at *5 (“We are still very far from a physiology-based pain assessment tool that 
could be used in clinical, forensic, and other applied settings.”).  
99 Marwan N. Baliki et al., Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the Default-Mode 
Network Dynamics, 28 J. NEUROSCI. 1398 (2008) (using fMRI to show default-mode network changes in 
chronic pain sufferers). 
100 Id. 
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and restrictive.  The variability not only fails to comport with pain science but violates 
horizontal equity, as similarly-situated claimants may received different outcomes 
depending only on the circuit in which their cases proceed.  And, it imposes costs on the 
system: Circuits that use an under-defined standard may increase the likelihood of fraud 
and abuse, while those that use a harsh and unrealistic standard may frustrate the 
purposes of the Act.  This Part proposes ways in which judicial interpretation of the 
existing regulations ought to change to incorporate new scientific knowledge about 
chronic pain.  
A. Social Security Disability Doctrine and Practice Relating to Chronic Pain 
Disability, under the Social Security Disability Insurance program (SSDI), often 
turns crucially on pain — whether the claimant is in pain, and whether that pain is 
intense, constant, and traceable to an objectively identifiable medical condition.  
Although only about one in five Social Security claimants receives benefits pursuant to 
the Disability program, determining whether claimants in fact are disabled “now 
constitutes the major part of the Social Security Administration workload . . . .”101  SSA 
receives about six hundred thousand hearing requests annually, a large percentage of 
which involve claims of chronic pain.102   
Yet, the disability law regime has struggled with the problem of pain since its 
inception.  Despite its prominence as a cause of disability, “chronic pain” is not defined 
within the Social Security Administration’s regulations.  As a result of the Act’s silence 
on pain, early cases litigated under the Act held as a matter of law that pain could not be 
disabling.  This principle changed in 1961, when the Fifth Circuit held in Butler v. 
Flemming that chronic pain could constitute a disability under the Act.103  The Butler 
principle spread rapidly; eventually, every circuit recognized that pain could render a 
                                                
101 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 FED. REG. 16,424, 
16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (emphasis added);  see also Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and 
Social Security’s Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 191 (2007) 
(Symposium: Social Security in Transition) (describing the toll on administrative resources of 
adjudicating disability claims). 
102 Bloch, supra note 101, at 192 (providing figures). 
103 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961).   
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person disabled within the meaning of the Act.104  Such pain must arise from a 
“medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”105   
This double-edged recognition of pain as disabling, but only when it arises from 
a distinct or determinable impairment, endures today.  Chronic pain cannot serve as a 
valid category of disability unless the pain is caused by some condition separate from 
the pain itself, such rheumatoid or osteoarthritis giving rise to pain, or back injury 
giving rise to pain, and so forth.  Claimants who cannot point to a known medical 
condition capable of giving rise to pain cannot be found disabled based on pain — with 
one exception.  That exception is psychogenic or somatized pain.   
Since the disability regime’s inception, the drafters of the disability regulations 
and the judges who interpret them have recognized that disabling pain does frequently 
occur independently of a disabling injury or obvious disease.  To provide compensation 
to claimants who appeared to demonstrate genuine suffering but who could not show 
evidence of a distinct injury or disease, ALJs and federal judges arrived at the work-
around of finding such claimants psychiatrically disabled.  Claimants with chronic pain 
thus could qualify as disabled if they could receive a diagnosis and a finding of a 
psychiatric pain condition, generally either psychogenic pain, “somatoform pain 
disorder,” or “conversion disorder.”  This allows for financial recovery in some cases.  
However, it also reinforces the notion that chronic pain is hysterically generated — and 
it affords no recovery to people suffering from chronic pain who do not also 
demonstrate the symptoms necessary for a suitable psychiatric disorder.  The rest of this 
section explores in detail these issues under the regulations. 
1. Legal Framework:  Statutory and Regulatory Regime 
Under the Social Security Disability Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 423, disability 
insurance (DI) is available to any person with a “disability” who is an “insured” under 
the Act and who is under the age of 65.  Similarly, under the Social Security Insurance 
program (SSI) established in the same Act, benefits are available to people who are both 
                                                
104 I.J. Schiffres, Pain as "Disability" Entitling Insured to Disability Benefits Under § 103 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 423), 23 A.L.R.3d 1034, § 5[b] (2014) (describing the spread of Butler 
precedent and collecting cases). 
105  42 U.S.C.A. § 423 (d)(1)(A). 
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indigent and disabled.  The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment . . . .”106  The impairment, further, must “be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months.”107   
Within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a condition (like pain) can be 
“disabling” if it results from “a medical impairment” that could “reasonably be expected” 
to cause the kind and degree of impairment alleged.108  Medical proof is built into the 
statutory regime: the claimant must provide “objective medical evidence”109 showing a 
“medically determinable” impairment,110 and the associated disability must “result[] 
from anatomical [or] physiological … abnormalities” that are “demonstrable by 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”111  The Act is 
implemented through Federal Regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and 404.1529(b), 
which require a claimant to provide objective evidence of a “condition which could 
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.”  
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations define disabling pain nor list 
disabling pain conditions.112  In the absence of guidance in the Act or its regulations 
about what chronic pain is, administrative and Article III courts have struggled over 
time to determine how to adjudicate an increasing caseload of pain-based claims.  
Courts have found particularly challenging the subjective and variable nature of chronic 
pain, as well as claimants’ assertions that they suffer chronic pain in the absence of an 
obvious, ongoing injury.113 
                                                
106 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
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112 Schiffres, supra note 104, § 5[b].  As a result of the Act’s silence, early decisions under the Act held 
as a matter of law that pain could not be disabling.  Id. (collecting cases). 
113 Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Jan. 1987, at 26 
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how the trier of facts should evaluate subjective pain). 
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2. The Problematic 1984 Regulations: Pain as Symptom of “Something Else” 
As a result of ongoing judicial confusion and inconsistency, congress revisited 
the question of DI/SSI pain evaluation guidelines in the early 1980s.114  In 1984, 
congress issued new guidelines amending the Act that ostensibly instructed courts how 
to proceed in evaluating chronic pain claims.  The 1984 Amendment lays out a three-
part inquiry, codified and elaborated in SSA regulations.  Under the Amendment and 
the regulations derived from it, the claimant first must show by “by medically 
acceptable . . .  diagnostic techniques” that he or she suffers a “medical impairment that 
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities . . . .”115  This 
showing of medical causation is “a threshold requirement; a sine qua non” of any valid 
claim. 116   Second, the fact-finder must determine that the abnormalities could 
“reasonably be expected to produce the pain” to the degree complained of.117  If the 
pain is more severe or longer lasting than would be typical for the underlying 
impairment, then the ALJ is instructed to examine other evidence bearing on the degree 
of the claimant’s pain and his or her resulting impairment.  Third and finally, the 
medically-demonstrable pain must reasonably “lead to a conclusion that the individual 
is under a disability,”118 meaning that the pain must preclude the claimant from 
engaging in “any substantial gainful activity.”119  
The Amendment and related regulations attempt to define when pain is legally 
disabling.  Yet, when read narrowly, these provisions do not define pain as a legally 
disabling condition at all.  Rather, the SSA recognizes as disabling any underlying 
medical impairments that reasonably and actually cause severe chronic pain, not chronic 
pain itself.  The first step of the inquiry is of a threshold showing of some “anatomical, 
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physiological or psychological abnormalit[y],” and the second step is the determination 
of whether such abnormality could be “reasonably expected to produce the pain.”120  
Pain thus is conceived of as the product, the output of the disease state or abnormal 
condition.  Thus, under the Act, pain cannot itself be the basis of a claim of disability.   
This distinction between pain as a symptom versus pain as a disease in itself 
might seem recondite.  But it has enormous importance:  The Act perpetuates the 
conception of pain-as-symptom, pain as derivative.  Instead, as discussed in Part II, 
chronic pain often is a disease in itself.  Chronic pain without lesion may be associated 
with abnormal biomarkers and brain states, yet currently there is no known cause for 
many chronic pain conditions or for why apparently healed peripheral injury can 
continue to be associated with pain.  This matters legally because it means that chronic 
pain often is not, as required by the Act, demonstrably the product of another 
impairment or condition.   
If under the guidelines the pain must be “produced by” another condition, then 
adjudicators face the problem of seemingly uncaused chronic pain, where the suffering 
is obvious but its sources are not.  Many judges have tried to interpret the requirement 
that pain arise from another condition generously, so that it comports with their general 
intuition that chronic pain can be real in the absence of an evident injury or with their 
particular assessment of a claimant as sincere in his or her suffering.  What judges have 
fallen back upon in the absence of a convincing mechanism to explain chronic pain has 
been the notion that chronic pain is a real disorder, but of psychiatric origin.   
Following the 1984 amendments, many judges started to do what some handful 
of them had done before: find that claimants are disabled by “psychogenic pain” or by 
the closely related psychiatric diagnosis of “somatoform pain disorder” (SPD), the 
modern heir to the old diagnosis of hysteria.  Psychogenic pain and SPD have been the 
savior and the nemesis of chronic pain claimants:  Savior, because these diagnoses 
provides legal and medical recognition and financial compensation for unexplained 
pain; nemesis, because shoe-horning chronic pain into these psychiatric diagnoses 
carries several negative consequences.  First, the claimant has to meet the burden of 
producing convincing evidence of psychogenic pain or SPD, which he may not be able 
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to offer if his condition is not psychiatric in origin.  Second, a claimant’s categorization 
as suffering from psychiatric pain may limit his or her access to medical interventions 
that would be contraindicated for psychiatric pain.  Treatment flows from diagnosis:  If 
the diagnosis is that a person’s chronic pain arises from repressed emotion, then an 
insurer might reimburse comparatively inexpensive psychiatric medication but might 
deny coverage for interventional procedures like nerve blocks.  Finally, if the claimant 
is successful, he or she then labors not only under the disability of pain but also the 
stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis.    
B. Improving SSDI Regulations with New Pain Science 
Although a claimant need not provide courts with “objective evidence of pain,” 
she must (reasonably enough) provide “objective evidence of a medical condition that 
could cause the pain alleged.”121  Yet, if current descriptions of pain chronification 
mechanisms are accurate, then much chronic pain will occur in the absence of any 
separate or distinct “condition” that “produce[s] the pain,” other than the chronic pain 
condition itself.122  At least as currently discernible by medical science, there may be no 
no obvious anatomical abnormality, no peripheral smoking gun.  
It sounds circular to say that pain is the symptom of the disease of pain, which 
reasonably can be expected to produce pain!  But the appearance of circularity is merely 
semantic.  It disappears if the relationship between the experience of pain and the 
condition giving rise to it is reconceptualized like this:  Chronic pain may be produced 
and maintained by neurological alterations, which modify the brain’s functional patterns 
and structure.  This type of central nervous system sensitization may arise in 
conjunction with a peripheral injury or disease, it may endure after a peripheral injury 
heals, or it may arise in the absence of any peripheral cause, as with primary headache 
syndromes.123 
To bring the regulations in line with the current state of medical knowledge 
about pain chronification, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and 404.1529(b) should be amended 
to recognize that chronic pain can persist after an initial trauma, injury, or disease has 
                                                
121 Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996). 
122 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), 404.1529(b) (2013). 
123 See supra Part II.B, notes 73– 79 (describing pain conditions). 
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actually or apparently resolved.  There are several ways that this amendment could be 
implemented.  I suggest that the language of the regulations be amended to read, 
“objective evidence of a medical condition, including chronic pain conditions, that 
could cause the pain alleged.”  This language would incorporate into the regulations the 
reality that chronic pain is a medical condition — a neurological disorder of diverse 
etiology but fairly uniform mechanism, characterized by abnormal activation of areas of 
the brain related to pain perception and generally independent of any peripheral input.   
Alternatively, the language of the regulations could remain as they are, but an 
advisory committee or other body within the Social Security Administration could 
promulgate an interpretive memorandum that defines chronic pain as an independent 
medical condition that satisfies the definition set forth in the regulations.  This 
memorandum should communicate the contemporary medical-scientific model of 
chronic pain as involving both peripheral and central nervous system alterations in pain 
transmission and perception.  It should emphasized that such central nervous system 
sensitization may arise in conjunction with a peripheral injury or disease or in the 
absence of a peripheral cause.  This is consistent with the requirement that claims be 
supported by objective medical evidence, as numerous diagnostic tests and criteria exist 
for the medical diagnosis chronic pain conditions.  
C. Revising Judge-Made Disability Standards in Light of New Pain Science 
To account for contemporary pain science, the ways judges adjudicate disability 
cases at the administrative and federal level similarly must evolve, in concert with 
amendments to the regulations or independently.  The regulations functionally may be 
changed through new judicial interpretations:  Courts have the authority to recognize 
medical evidence that chronic pain can be an independent and distinct medical 
condition under the regulations as they currently exist.  In this way, courts could simply 
incorporate evidence of pain chronification as a distinct neurological disorder into the 
existing disability framework that requires objective evidence of a medical condition 
that reasonably could lead to the degree of pain alleged.   
This avenue of constructive judicial amendment of the regulations is attractive 
because it does not require time-consuming administrative or legislative action.  
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However, it ought to be a second-line alternative to revision of the regulations:  It relies 
on diffuse bodies, ALJs and Article III judges, independently becoming aware of 
contemporary pain science and then crafting appropriate interpretive and evidentiary 
standards.  Given the range of cases that judges must handle on a daily basis, it is not 
realistic to expect that more than a few of them will come to the scientific literature on 
their own and develop new standards.  Moreover, district court judges, who are the 
more likely sources of innovation, are constrained by the standards already established 
by the appellate courts of their circuits.  However, until SSA does act on this — and 
recall that SSA has been stalled since 1984 — individual judges may use their 
courtrooms as “laboratories of innovation.”124 
This short section first describes the different and conflicting judge-made 
standards that circuits employ to interpret the SSDI regulations.  These varying 
standards reflect a continuum from leniency to harshness, yet none reflects 
contemporary pain science.  These varying standards also lead to radically different 
outcomes for similarly-situated claimants.  After exploring the case law, this section 
suggests how courts could use pain science to revise their circuits’ interpretations of 
these regulations.  
1. Judge-Made Disability Law and its Vagaries  
Even though ALJs and federal courts continue to engage faithfully in the 
Regulations’ prescribed inquiries, they reach wildly divergent conclusions and have 
established inconsistent standards across federal circuits.  Courts do share a basic 
consensus that pain must be severe to qualify as disabling; also, they agree that a person 
is not disabled merely because he or she cannot work pain-free.  Beyond that foundation, 
courts across the United States apply three quite distinct pain evaluation standards.  
Although the courts that articulate these standards all cite the SSA regulation, nothing in 
that Regulation sets forth any one the elements of these requirements, much less all of 
them.  These inconsistent and often vague standards leave adjudicators in the position of 
needing to fall back on their personal judgment about what pain looks like and whose 
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pain they believe to be real.   
The most permissive standard provides that, to be disabled by pain, a claimant 
may be capable of gainful employment but that engaging in such employment would 
cause the claimant “great pain.”125  This is a minority standard, perhaps because it is in 
some tension with the SSD regulation providing that a claimant must be incapable of 
performing “any substantial gainful activity.”126 
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions apply an intermediate standard.  This 
standard provides that a person’s pain must be so severe as to preclude gainful 
employment entirely, rendering work impossible.127  Under this standard, a person who 
would experience “great pain” from his or her work duties, but who was not entirely 
“preclude[d]” from performing them, would not qualify as disabled.   
The most draconian pain standard is that developed by the Fifth Circuit.  
According to the case law of that circuit, to qualify as disabling, pain must not only 
preclude the claimant from any significant gainful employment; it also “must be 
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.” 128  This 
standard is not grounded in the language or substance of any disability statutes or 
regulations and is flatly contrary to the biology of chronic pain diseases.  Chronic pain 
conditions remit and relapse.  Many people with life-long chronic pain conditions may 
have pain-free days.  A person also may have pain every day, but the level of pain will 
vary from day to day, and often from morning to night.129  Indeed, a claim that one’s 
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pain is absolutely invariable is more likely to be a marker of an inartfully fabricated 
claim than of an actual chronic pain condition.  Moreover, fortunately, almost all 
chronic pain conditions can be at least partially treated, whether interventionally, 
pharmacologically, or behaviorally.  Thus this standard’s requirement that the condition 
be “wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” is as misguided as its insistence that 
the pain be constant in its level.  
It is ironic that a judicial interpretation of the disability regulations perhaps 
inspired by judges’ desire to reduce fraudulent claims instead would articulate criteria 
more likely to reward the fraudster than the legitimate claimant, while enshrining the 
notion that claimants who do not meet this fictitious characterization of pain are frauds!  
This problem-fraught standard might be of limited interest beyond the Fifth Circuit, 
except that it is spreading to federal courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eight Circuits, as well as to some ALJs.  Because of its legal significance and the 
instructive depth of its manifold error, it is worth analyzing this standard and its history 
closely.   
The story of this standard dates back forty years to an opinion issued by an ALJ 
against claimant Chaney, holding he was not disabled because he did not have any 
“significant signs” consistent with chronic pain.130  Cheney appealed and, in Chaney v. 
Califano, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.131  In considering the ALJ’s finding that the 
claimant was not disabled, the court quoted the ALJ’s statement that: 
[P]ain is a subjective symptom that is not measurable, and it is 
recognized that there are many disorders in which . . . pain is 
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic 
measures. Generally, when an individual has suffered severe pain 
for a long time, there are observable signs . . . . In the instant case, 
there are no such significant signs or circumstances.132 
 
Highlighting this language from the ALJ’s opinion, the court in Chaney did not 
hold against the claimant because his pain was not “constant, unremitting, and wholly 
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unresponsive to treatment.”133  Nor did it state that only pain rising to that level 
constitutes statutory disability.  Rather, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
against Chaney because he showed “no … significant signs” of suffering “severe pain 
for a long time.”134  The disability standard the AJL actually employed, and that 
adopted by the circuit, was simply “severe pain for a long time,” not pain “constant, 
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to treatment.”  Effectively, the court held quite 
reasonably and unremarkably that a disability claim must be supported by evidence of 
the disability. 
Yet several years later, in Hames v. Heckler, a different panel of the Circuit 
seized on that dicta from Cheney to hold that “[p]ain, in and of itself has been 
recognized as a disabling condition under the Act, but only where it is constant, 
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.” 135   Heckler thus 
established in the Fifth Circuit a pain evaluation standard that is: (1) not present in the 
Act or any of the SSA’s regulations; (2) based on an apparent misreading of the 
Circuit’s own prior case law; and (3) wholly inconsistent with the biology of chronic 
pain.136   
More than one third of other circuit courts now employ the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard in some cases.  Although none of these circuits has adopted the standard across 
the board, each employs it selectively.  Courts’ selective use of this harsh and restrictive 
standard in some cases, but not in others, could result from any variety of factors from 
judges’ beliefs about the appropriate scope of social programs to variable research 
quality among law clerks.  It may also reflect judges’ personal responses to a claimant 
or type of pain syndrome, or a general skepticism toward pain claimants.  
2. Normative Dimensions of Judge-Made Standards  
The Seventh Circuit case Carradine v. Barnhart is just one case of many that 
illuminates the normative, rather than doctrinal or medical, values that play into 
mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and totally unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” 
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standard.137  In Carradine, a panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of the 
ALJ that the claimant was not disabled due to chronic back pain.138  The plaintiff had 
endured several spinal surgeries, had a morphine pump implanted in her spine, and had 
severely curtailed her daily activities, but reported that she occasionally could take short 
walks or do some shopping.139  She did not have a history of mental illness.140  However, 
she lacked evidence of spinal abnormality or other visible causes of the alleged severe 
chronic pain.141   
Working within the constraints imposed by the regulations that a claimant 
cannot be disabled due to chronic pain without providing evidence of an objective 
medical condition that could produce the pain, Judge Posner penned a majority opinion 
finding Carradine disabled due to psychogenic pain, “somatoform pain disorder.”142  
Carradine’s case presented no evidence of psychiatric disability independent of her 
persistent back pain. 143  Yet, because Carradine did not have evidence of gross 
abnormalities or a disease independent of back pain itself, the court was constrained by 
the regulations either to find that she was not disabled or that Carradine’s disability 
originated in a psychiatric disorder.  Crediting the record that Carradine had endured 
risky and painful surgeries to find relief from her pain, and that she increasingly 
withdrew from pleasurable life activities, the majority was unwilling to find that she 
was not both experiencing pain and disabled by it.  Accordingly, it crafted a remedy 
through relying on the psychiatric diagnosis available under the regulations. 
The majority holding engendered a blistering dissent, written almost entirely in 
italics, with bold for emphasis, mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and wholly 
unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.144  What makes the dissent remarkable 
beyond its typography is that it baldly asserts that chronic pain in the absence of evident 
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peripheral injury simply does not exist — and that any claim to the contrary is pure 
fakery.  The dissent berates the majority for failing to apply the “constant, unremitting, 
and totally unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.145  It notes that Carradine 
admitted that, on good days, she could take a short walk with her daughter; this, the 
dissent emphasizes, shows that the pain is not “constant and unremitting” and, therefore, 
not disabling.  It goes on to assert that any pain without a clear peripheral cause, like 
Mrs. Carradine’s back pain, is either imagined or faked.146  
While the majority employs the psychiatric route as a way to compensate a 
claimant, the dissent argues the reverse: that people with psychogenic pain should not 
be rewarded.147  Such rewards, the dissent argues, just encourages what is, in effect, bad 
behavior — like giving a child an ice cream for a temper tantrum.  In this manner, the 
dissent reinforces the stereotype that chronic pain patients are self-indulgent malingers 
or hysterics and that the only remedy they deserve is the sharp admonition to snap out 
of it. 
The Carradine dissent is exemplary in tipping its normative hand: An 
adjudicator in the Fifth Circuit would be constrained to apply this standard, which is 
part of that jurisdiction’s precedent.  Yet, in jurisdictions like the Seventh Circuit, where 
this standard is uncommon, an adjudicator must make an affirmative choice to adopt it 
as an expression of a negative perception of pain-based disability.  Further, although the 
Carradine dissent stands out stands in its vitriol toward the claimant and chronic pain 
claimants generally, it is not substantively an aberration.  Certain judges across the 
country selectively apply the “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive” 
standard, and two lower courts had held consistently with this appellate dissent. 
Ironically, the majority’s need to rely on the psychiatric diagnosis to support its 
disability finding feeds into the very stereotypes that animate the dissent.  The majority, 
however, took this route because it was constrained by the regulations to find a 
psychiatric cause of disability.  This means that the regulations themselves, in their 
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attempt to provide a compensable category of disability for chronic pain without lesion 
through the somatoform diagnosis, undermine their purpose by misdescribing many 
chronic pain syndromes and by marginalizing chronic pain sufferers as mentally ill.  
Perhaps with greater medical knowledge and objective proof of the mechanisms that 
cause chronic pain, prevalent norms of skepticism and hostility toward chronic pain 
claimants can be supplanted.   
IV. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE “SOFT” AND “HARD” EVIDENTIARY PRACTICES 
This Part explores neuroimaging evidence in light of the “hard” and “soft” 
practices of evidence law — that is, relative to the text of the rules as well as in light of 
the arguably more important norms and expectations that decision-makers use to give 
content and meaning to those rules.  These norms and expectations shape not only 
judges’ evidentiary calls but also their statutory interpretation practices and, thus, the 
creation of doctrine.  This section will argue that neuroimaging currently ought to have 
some impact on both hard and soft practices, but far more on the latter.  
Evidence practice at trial consists of more than the application of the rules; it 
embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative process of 
judges and juries.  These “soft” practices shape the trial process from the earliest stages 
of case building through to the appellate process, as decision-makers at each stage 
evaluate evidentiary relevance, weight, and prejudice in light of their cultural and 
narrative expectations.  Partly rooted in fear of fraud, partly in Freudian misconceptions 
of “hysteria,” soft practices of evidence relating to pain claimants may reflect 
entrenched biases.  Judges and juries’ norms and expectations about chronic pain 
claimants and about the type of evidence required to make the claims credible should 
and likely will change in light of the new neuroscientific model of chronic pain.  
At the same time, neuroimaging evidence may find its way into the “hard” 
practices of evidence.  In some cases, it likely will be appropriate to admit some 
neuroimaging studies of chronic pain into evidence under the federal and state evidence 
rules.  Aggregate data about the average impact of pain conditions can inform doctrines 
relating to pain claims and expectations about the likely presentation and lifecourse of a 
typical pain sufferer.  Currently, however, neuroimaging should not be introduced to 
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support or attack an individual’s claim relating to chronic pain.148  This is because of 
certain limitations of neuroimaging technologies and the medical variability of chronic 
pain conditions.  This is not to say never, however:  Science and technology in this area 
are developing quickly and, in ten years’ time, another view may be the right one. 
This Part will look first at how “soft” evidentiary practices may be shifted by 
pain neuroimaging.  It explores several evidentiary theories to explain how existing 
background expectations — whether called narratives, scripts, or another of the myriad 
terms scholars use for like phenomena — about chronic pain distort the legal process.  It 
then offers specific suggestions for how new scientific models can change social and 
legal constructions in this arena, thus affecting evidence admissibility and weight, and, 
ultimately, the outcomes of cases.  It then turns to “hard” evidence practices, 
considering how pain neuroimaging evidence should be evaluated under federal, state, 
and administrative evidence regimes.  It concludes that pain neuroimaging and related 
research ought to be admissible in appropriate cases at the aggregate level but not to 
prove pain in any individual case. 
A. “Soft” Evidentiary Practices Shape the Litigation Process  
1. Narrative, Norms & the Meaning of Proof: the Soft Side of Evidence Law 
The kind and degree of proof that satisfies a reasonable person relates to his or 
her understanding of the nature of the problem under consideration.  Claims about 
expected or common events seem relatively plausible; these might be called 
“confirming” claims because they agree with the average decision-maker’s lived 
experience and expectations.  Claims about rare or unexpected events, conversely, 
invite relative skepticism; these might be called “confounding” claims because they 
confound the average decision-maker’s experience, expectations, or beliefs.  
Confirming claims require less, and less specialized, evidence than confounding claims, 
which may require extraordinary proof or even strike the relevant decision-maker as 
unprovable. 
Chronic pain presents confounding claims because most decision-makers have 
little direct experience of such conditions; further, they are likely to hold common but 
                                                
148 See infra Part V.B. 
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mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes, presentation, and persistence.  Indeed, 
there is active disinformation about chronic pain:  A dominant cultural narrative depicts 
chronic pain conditions as expressions of neurosis or hysteria, and legal doctrines, like 
those in disability law, directly incorporate this narrative into law. 
Whether a claim is confirming or confounding — whether it accords with 
background norms and expectations — has implications for the entire legal process and 
for evidence law in particular.  Evidence scholarship must attend not only to the ways in 
which background expectations generally influence the fact-finding process but to 
instances where specific, erroneous expectations distort the legal process.  These 
distortions can affect evidence admissibility determinations, the degree of weight that 
decision-makers give to admitted evidence, the ways in which decision-makers evaluate 
evidence against the relevant legal standard, and the conclusions that they reach in the 
matter.149   
The role of cultural expectations and scripts, or “narratives,” is central to 
numerous theories of evidence law and, indeed, to theories of the construction of law 
itself.  Preeminent legal scholars of the latter part of the Twentieth Century, like Robert 
Cover, put narrative at the center of the legal academy’s agenda with articles like 
Nomos and Narrative, in which he argued that legal actors create a shared normative 
world — a nomos — through operative narratives, and that all legal production and 
interpretation takes place within the nomos.150   Narrative studies within law advanced 
the project of excavating contestable narratives and then of crafting counter-narratives 
and counter-histories to challenge them.151  More contemporary theories of judicial and 
juror decision-making have moved away from the literary emphasis of narrative theory, 
                                                
149 Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 315 (2013) (noting that background 
expectations or narrative assumptions present “procedural issues from end to end in the process of 
adjudication.”). 
150 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983); see also Robert M. Cover, The 
Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 180 (1985).  
151 Narrative studies is not a single movement but a methodology engaged in by legal scholars working in 
various domains, particularly in critical race studies and in law and literature.  For foundational work 
emphasizing the role of narrative in constructing law’s nomos, see Cover, supra note 150; LON FULLER, 
THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).  For an influential example of a scholarly construction of counter-
narrative and counter-history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1419, 1511 (1993) (“Counterhistory is a way for a suppressed community to claim our own identity. 
. . .  This Article is an exercise in such counterhistory . . . .”).  
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drawing instead on fields ranging from logical philosophy to behavioral economics.152  
These contemporary theories and older narrative-based theories share a central insight: 
Decision-makers impose order on the teeming facts of the world by screening in 
evidence that is confirming and screening out evidence that is confounding, consistently 
preferring the interpretation that conforms to their expectations. 
2. Confounding Claims and the Quantum of Proof Needed to “Prove” 
 Degrees of doubt often inversely shadow degrees of understanding and 
acceptance.  Thresholds of proof track cultural narratives and evolve as those narratives 
evolve.  Up through the mid-20th Century, when it was commonly believed that women 
lied about consensual sex to protect their reputations for chastity or fabricated a rape 
claim entirely, more evidence of rape was necessary to render credible a complainant’s 
allegation. 153   Statutes requiring independent corroboration of the rape victim’s 
complaint, which have their roots in biblical law, were in force in jurisdictions in the 
United States through the 1970s.154  Other formal sources of evidence practice like 
pattern jury instructions also embodied the doubt and skepticism facing rape 
complainants.  Even into the 1980s, pattern jury instructions stated that failure to 
promptly report a claim of rape supported an inference of fabrication.155  Another jury 
instruction, derived from Lord Hale, cautioned jurors that a rape accusation “is one 
which is easily made .… [T]he law requires that you examine the testimony of the 
[alleged victim] with caution.”156   
Evidence law and practice in this area emerged from and reinforced norms of 
                                                
152 See infra at notes 161–173Error! Bookmark not defined. (discussing work by Pardo, Allen, 
Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, and others). 
153 Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1977).  
154 See Anon., The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L. J. 1365 (1972); 
Irving Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses in New York, 40 
FORDHAM L. REV. 263 (1971); see also Berger, supra note 153, at 9 (describing the history of the repeal 
of corroboration statutes).  
155 Burger, supra note 153, at 10; see also Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a 
Victim’s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1087 (1988) (describing the continued 
vitality of this rule in New York and other jurisdictions through the late 1980s). 
156 Berger, supra note 153, at 10 (citing as an example a then-common jury instruction, California Jury 
Instructions, Crim. (CALJIC) No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970)). 
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suspicion about women’s veracity, especially as to matters of sex. 157   They 
incorporated, too, a concern about fraud:  Fraudulent claims are easy to make and hard 
to disprove.  In these areas, subsequent dialogue between research data and normative 
change has altered the landscape of proof — not so much through changes in law itself 
as through changes in the default expectations of the participants in the system.158   
Chronic pain is not equivalent to crimes of sexual assault, and chronic pain 
claimants are not viewed in a manner directly equivalent to rape victims.  But the 
former is an illustrative parallel to the latter for several reasons.  Chronic pain affects 
both men and women but affects women significantly disproportionately; background 
concerns about the unreliable female narrator thus affect pain claimants, too.159  Chronic 
pain claims, like claims of sexual victimization, have long invited doubt and even 
presumptions of fabrication.  And the hysterical or secondary gain theories of chronic 
pain share an origin with some of the psychoanalytic theories suggesting that women 
fantasize sexual violence, specifically because they enjoy the status of victimhood or 
the subjective feeling of victimization itself.160  Further, and perhaps most importantly, 
the history of change in evidence law related to rape shows how evidence incorporates 
and reinforces background expectations or schemas about particular kinds of claimants.   
Reliance on narratives and background expectations may “conflict … with the 
truth-seeking goals of trial” and “risk distortions in fact-finding.”161  Several scholars 
have pointed to these risks and flaws in decision-making as opportunities to “to increase 
analytic processing” by nudging trials away from the narrative model.162  It is likely that 
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161 Griffin, supra note 149, at 285. 
162 Id. at 285; Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & 
PHIL. 223, 225 n.3, 235 (2008). 
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aspects of narrative are inescapable in the legal process; indeed, narrative may be 
essential to all legal endeavors, given that the structures and forms of the legal systems 
have emerged from human cognition.  The purpose here would not be to remove 
narrative itself, but to change the narrative expectations and content. 
Contemporary models offer a range of alternative accounts of how judges and 
jurors weigh diverse facts to reach a verdict or judgment.  Like the narrative model, 
these models also rely heavily on decision-makers’ background assumptions about the 
world — that is, their norms and expectations.  Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen have 
advanced a decision-making model that they call the “explanation-based model.”163  In 
their account, jurors engage in a technique of “inference to the best explanation” 
(known formally in logical philosophy as “abductive reasoning”) to arrive at a 
conclusion that reconciles the facts of the case in a way that is “simple” and 
“coherent.”164  By “coherent,” Pardo and Allen mean a story that “better accords with 
background beliefs . . . .”165  As in the narrative model, the abductive or explanation-
based model describes and predicts that decision-makers discount or outright reject 
facts that do not comport with their background beliefs.  Thus, background beliefs do a 
large share of the work in both explaining how decision-makers weigh evidence and in 
constituting what counts as legal proof.   
Evidence scholarship that draws on behavioral economics also supports the role 
of background expectations or culturally received stories.  Several of the key heuristics 
and biases identified by behavioral economics support the conclusion decision-makers 
prefer confirming stories and resist confounding stories.  Following the influential work 
of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, prominent scholars like Dan Simon have 
explored the implications of a “two system” method of decision-making.  The “two 
system” hypothesis posits that people engage functionally (albeit not neurologically) 
distinct cognitive systems for making different kinds of decisions.  People mobilize 
System 1 for rapid, intuitive decision-making; they mobilize a functionally distinct 
System 2 for more considered or “rational” decisions.    
                                                
163 Pardo & Allen, supra note 162, at 225. 
164 Id. at 226. 
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The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521 (1991). 
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Decisions achieved via one system are not necessarily better than those achieved 
by the other;  both forms of decision-making have strengths and weaknesses.  However, 
empirical research demonstrates that rapid System 1 decisions are highly inaccurate 
when subjects rely on intuition about subjects in which they do not have deep 
experience. 166   This is troubling, because most daily decision-making could be 
described as System 1; yet, most of the decisions one must reach in a legal context are 
outside of the ordinary experience of decision-makers. .  Where intuitive decision-
making is not grounded in experience or expertise, but instead informed by received 
cultural stories and “common sense,” it tends to recapitulate misinformation and 
stereotype.  Such research suggests, depressingly, most people’s intuitions are wrong 
most of the time — even though, to the decision-maker, the intuitive decision feels so 
right.  
Mobilizing the language of narrative theory and of behavioral economics, 
Professor Griffin argues that behavioral economics research confirms the ways in which 
narrative has a significant effect on fact-finding.167  Narrative expectations, she argues, 
“provide[] a deep structure inside the courtroom just as [they do] outside of it . . . .”168  
This is because judges and jurors exhibit “confirmation bias” — that is, the tendency to 
“interpret evidence in a fashion that supports existing preferences, beliefs, expectations, 
and theories.”169  Further, in “moments of uncertainty,” judges and jurors (like all 
people faced with complex or uncertain decisions) display “belief perseverance”; belief 
perseverance makes them “more likely to doubt evidence that conflicts with a 
preexisting paradigm and to interpret what is ambiguous as consistent with that 
belief.”170  Yet, such decision-makers feel that they have come to accurate, factual 
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decisions, rejecting that “implicit emotional response[s]” could affect them as 
“source[s] of prejudice.”171   
These accounts — narrative, abductive, and behavioral economic — about how 
cognitive processes shape evidence law and trial process share a fundamental 
premise:172  Background expectations about the nature of the world and people’s 
behavior shape what decision-makers credit as proof, how they weigh such proof, and 
the conclusions that they draw from such proof.  These theories are all formalized ways 
of stating that people (a) reject as implausible that which conflicts with what they 
believe they know; and (b) seek to construct accounts from evidence that comport with 
their beliefs “about what typically happens in the world.”173  And rightly so: It would be 
impossible to navigate the world without relying on background expectations.  Yet, 
unstated background expectations can also lead to systematic prejudices and errors, as 
the next Section will explore. 
B. “Soft” Practices of Evidence Law Encode Bias 
 While reliance on story and archetype are not inherently objectionable and may 
be unavoidable, it is important to attend to where narrative operates and to its particular 
content.  “Adjudication produces institutionalized meaning from evidence”; thus it is 
important to examine “constructs and procedures” that facilitate or inhibit the accuracy 
of the legal process.174  Indeed, evidence law and practice is rife with examples of the 
ways in which background expectations distort the fact-finding process and lead 
decision-makers astray.  Just a few include the common bias in favor of the reliability of 
— and, hence, both admissibility and weight accorded to — eye witness 
identifications,175 the correlation between a witness’s confidence in a memory and the 
                                                                                                                                          
2098, 2099 (1979) (“[J]udgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the 
meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the 
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171 Griffin, supra note 149, at 314. 
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173 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 165, at 522. 
174 Griffin, supra note 149, at 290. 
175 See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, 
Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 119–20 
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accuracy of that memory,176 and the disproportionate credibility decision-makers assign 
to forensic sciences (the so-called “CSI effect”).177 
The chronic pain claimant currently faces high degrees of skepticism — she is 
“the girl who cried pain.”178  But this, too, is likely to change as greater understanding 
of the facts of chronic pain diseases spread through legal and general culture.  Judicial 
and continuing legal education, and the use of expert witnesses to educate juries (and 
judges) within the courtroom, can change the normative and factual expectations the 
participants within these systems.  
Adjudicators’ skepticism of or hostility toward chronic pain claimants may 
arises in some part from a pre-scientific vision of pain as emotional dysfunction, which 
emerged from a historical literature that few readers today would recognize as medical 
or scientific: the “anecdata” of the psychoanalytic case history, like the Anna O. case 
discussed in Part I, which are an often highly unreliable narrative form.  These tropes 
continue to be peddled today:  Even a cursory Amazon.com search reveals dozens of 
popular books extoling the premise that a person who adjusts her attitude and 
acknowledges her emotions will free herself of persistent chronic pain — in as little as 
one day!179  Similarly, there is an industry of defense experts that supports this 
relationship.180  
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Contemporary pain researchers acknowledge the essential interrelationship of 
one’s emotional life and the life of the body, but not in this magical, mind-over-matter 
manner.181  Along with rejecting hysteria as the etiology of chronic pain, mainstream 
pain scientists similarly make short shrift of previously popular ideas like “secondary 
gain,” the increasingly-discredited notion that people with long-term, unexplained 
chronic pain unconsciously exaggerate or manufacture their pain because they enjoy the 
status or attention or other intangible benefits that come to them by virtue of being 
disabled.182 
Emotion and pain are related in important ways.  First and foremost, pain creates 
a negative emotional experience (if we perceived it as a positive experience, it would be 
pleasure!).183  Chronic pain has emotional consequences as sufferers miss out on living 
the lives they had or wish they could have; social isolation, loss of work, loss of 
income, and, of course, constant suffering, lead to understandable emotional distress.184  
Chronic pain compromises the brain’s cognitive and affective functioning, creating 
cognitive and emotional difficulties as a side effect of the pain syndrome.185  Depressed 
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mood and stress can augment the experience of pain, while pleasurable and distracting 
activities, and strong social support, can moderate pain.186  
Yet, the one way in which emotion and chronic pain most frequently are not 
related is the one embedded in our legal system: That chronic pain is predominantly a 
form of hysteria in which emotionally-disturbed people unconsciously generate the 
experience of pain.  The next section proposes ways in which this new understanding of 
chronic pain, and of the relationship between chronic pain and emotion, should reform 
evidentiary doctrines and practices related to chronic pain. 
C. New “Soft” Evidentiary Norms for Adjudicators and Fact-Finders 
A new set of norms about chronic pain ought to be incorporated into the legal 
system, to unseat the pejorative and medically outmoded premises built into the SSDI 
regime, judicial interpretations of SSDI regulations, and decisions-makers’ 
presumptions in non-SSDI cases.  This section presents a new, suggested set of default 
norms. 
From a rebuttable presumption of hysteria or fraud to a neutral presumption.  
The first and most important normative shift around chronic pain starts with baseline 
presumptions.  Although not universal, a dominant presumption is that the chronic pain 
claimant is mentally ill or is fabricating the claim.  In place of this pejorative norm, with 
its lingering Freudianism, there ought to be a neutral presumption that the pain claimant, 
like any other disability or tort claimant, may or may not be credible and needs to prove 
her case.   
Chronic pain is not a form of mental illness.  Chronic pain is not a mental illness 
and typically does not result from mental illness.  Depressive illness and cognitive 
impairment more often follow the development of a chronic pain condition than precede 
it.  In a subset of chronic pain patients, a history of trauma may have created a 
biological predisposition  to develop chronic pain in response to an injury.  Whether a 
claimant had this latent predisposition does not make the condition the claimant’s fault, 
nor does it mean that he or she can fix the subsequently-developed pain condition 
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through addressing the emotional issue.  Rather, it makes these individuals the classic 
vulnerable victims or “glass jaw” plaintiffs. 
Mental illness as a direct cause of chronic pain can occur but it is exceedingly 
rare.  Psychogenic pain conditions do occur.  However, as the DSM-IV cautions, these 
conditions are rare and unusual.  According to the DSM, psychiatrists (and others) 
should be reluctant to diagnose psychogenic pain or somatoform disorder in the absence 
of clear indicators that the chronic pain condition does not result primarily from a non-
psychiatric medical condition.  
Chronic pain cannot be braved away with a positive attitude.  Culturally 
received stories of people being miraculously cured of their chronic pain through 
identifying and resolving an emotional conflict are just that — stories.  They may in 
some cases be true stories, just as some religious believers in fact experience remission 
of disease symptoms through faith healing.  Yet, such anecdotes do not prove that 
chronic pain can be talked away through psychotherapy or braved away through 
positive thinking any more than faith healing stories suggest that hospitals should be 
converted into churches. 
Chronic pain fluctuates, and chronic pain conditions can be relapsing-remitting.  
People with chronic pain conditions have good days and bad days.  These good days 
and bad days may relate to the lifecourse of the disease (unexplained but disease-typical 
variations over time) or to patient-specific or external factors, including degree of social 
support, physical therapy, medical treatment, financial and other pressures, and overall 
mood.187  Decision-makers should understand that the presence of good days does not 
mean the person is faking it on the bad days, and instead should expect to see some 
variation.  This understanding of chronic pain as inherently variable, and 
relapsing/remitting, is contrary to the Fifth Circuit standard that, to be legally disabling, 
chronic pain must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic 
treatment.”188  
Paternalism toward chronic pain patients is inappropriate and anti-therapeutic.  
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Decision-makers adjudicating chronic pain claims at times adopt a questionable 
paternalism toward chronic pain claimants.  One such notion is that attention and 
compensation perpetuate the claimant’s pain by “rewarding” the pain behavior.  This 
belief leads to the conclusion that chronic pain claimants need to be denied 
compensation as a kind of “tough love” that will help them move on with their lives.  
There are three problems with this approach, one of which is factual and two of which 
are legal.  The factual issue is that there is no evidence that the reward theory is true, 
and a lot of evidence that it is not.189  The first legal issue is that this approach violates 
horizontal equity:  As to no other condition or category of claimants do decision-makers 
argue that they ought to withhold otherwise merited compensation for the good of the 
claimant.  The second legal-theoretical problem with the reward theory relates to the 
institutional role of the decision-maker.  Judges have an important and appropriate role 
in interpreting law and regulations, and in developing the common law.  Doing so is not 
judicial activism, it is judicial performance.  However, if a law or regulation provides 
that a disability is compensable, or tort law provides that a negligently caused 
impairment is compensable, then it is inappropriate activism for the judge to treat 
differently one category of disabilities or impairments based on beliefs about what 
would be good for the plaintiff/claimant.  
IV. CHRONIC PAIN NEUROIMAGING AND “HARD” EVIDENCE PRACTICES: THE CASE 
FOR LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY OF PAIN NEUROIMAGING 
 
Moving on from “soft” evidentiary considerations involving norms and 
narratives, this Part considers “hard” or black-letter legal questions about the 
admissibility of expert evidence concerning chronic pain that emerges from pain 
neuroimaging studies.  Neuroimaging, and testimony about such neuroimaging, 
concerning the ways chronic pain changes the brain ought to be admissible in suitable 
cases.  Such evidence will not be relevant in every case involving a chronic pain claim.  
The best and most valid uses of such evidence will be to inform the fact-finders’ and 
adjudicators’ understanding of what chronic pain is and to assist them in their 
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evaluation of the rest of the evidence.  Aggregate neuroimaging evidence showing how 
chronic pain changes the brain can educate the fact finder, first, about the reality of 
chronic pain diseases and, second, about how a particular chronic pain condition may 
on average affect sufferers’ brains and behavior.  It should not, however, be admitted to 
prove or disprove the presence of chronic pain in any individual claimant, as 
neuroimaging techniques are not sufficiently reliable at the individual level.  
Claims involving chronic pain may arise in federal, state, or administrative 
proceedings.  This Part opens by briefly describing the federal, state, and Social 
Security administrative standards for admitting expert medical and scientific evidence.  
These evidentiary regimes differ in important ways; they vary as to whether they 
prescribe specific tests for the qualifications of experts and expert evidence, and, if so, 
as to the tests they prescribe.  Yet the touchstone of admissibility across all of them is 
the same:  Whether the evidence is relevant, and whether its relevance outweighs its 
potential to mislead or confuse the finder of fact.  Thus, while recognizing the ways in 
which these evidentiary regimes vary, this Part offers largely consistent proposals for 
what types of pain neuroimaging evidence should, and should not, be admitted in 
federal, state, or SSA proceedings.  
A. Federal, State, and Administrative Admissibility Standards 
Federal, state, and SSA rules for the admissibility of expert scientific and 
medical evidence are designed to admit evidence that is relevant and helpful to the fact 
finder, and to exclude evidence that is not.  These three regimes may be characterized as 
falling on a continuum, on which the SSA is the most liberal in admitting medical and 
scientific evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence occupy a middle ground, and state 
evidence laws modeled on the Frye standard are the most restrictive.  Despite their 
differences, however, relevant neuroimaging evidence offered to educate the finder of 
fact about various pain conditions ought to satisfy each of these admissibility standards.  
This short section describes standards for expert evidence under each of these regimes 
and then applies these standards to evaluate the admissibility of this type of evidence. 
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1. Federal Rules of Evidence 
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 702 govern the admissibility of expert 
evidence, including scientific and medical evidence.190  Rule 401 provides that all 
relevant evidence is admissible, unless it is subject to some special exclusion; evidence 
is not admissible if it is not relevant.191  Once a court has determined that proffered 
expert evidence is relevant, it evaluates its admissibility under Rule 702, which governs 
expert evidence.  The touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702 is whether the expert 
evidence will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.”192  If a matter is within the experience and understanding of jurors, expert 
evidence on that matter is not admissible because of the concern that the expert will 
usurp the function of the jury.  If a matter is outside of the understanding and 
experience of the typical juror, and it is material to the determination of some aspect of 
the case, a court may admit expert testimony to enable jurors come to an informed 
conclusion about the matter.193 
After a court determines that expert evidence may aid the jury, the burden is on 
the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that it satisfies threshold requirements for 
set forth in Rule 702.  Rule 702, which incorporates standards that the Supreme Court 
developed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,194 requires that the expert 
testimony be “based upon sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable 
principles and methods.”195  Finally, the expert must have “applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case.”196  Even evidence based on reliable principles 
                                                
190 FED. R. EVID. 401, 702. 
191 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
192 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
193 FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (expert witnesses may testify as to matters of opinion if the opinion “will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). 
194 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
195 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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and methods, though, must be excluded if “there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion offered.”197 
The precise meaning of these requirements has given rise to a large literature 
and some significant dispute.198  The rule itself offers no guidance on what makes a 
principle or method “reliable,” nor what makes facts and data “sufficient.”  Further, the 
rule is entirely silent on how a court ought to determine whether the principles and 
methods — even if reliable and sufficient — are adequately related to the expert’s 
conclusion.  Daubert lists a few illustrative factors that a trial judge may consider to 
assess the reliability and sufficiency of expert evidence.  These include whether the “the 
theory or technique” “has been subjected to peer review,” whether it has “a known or 
potential error rate,” and “whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a 
relevant scientific community.”199  
As Professor Eleanor Swift has noted, this standard grants wide latitude to trial 
judges as gatekeepers of scientific evidence.200  Scholars and judges agree that it tends 
toward liberal admissibility:  Many judges engage in limited independent evaluation of 
medical, scientific or other expert evidence and instead trust the adversary process to 
test evidence through a “battle of the experts.”201 
2. State Rules of Evidence 
State evidence codes, like the Federal Rules of Evidence, also condition the 
admissibility of any evidence on its relevance:  Relevant evidence is presumptively 
admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.202  However, many states apply a standard 
                                                
197 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely 
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between the data and the opinion proffered”). 
198 Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert 
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(2000). 
201 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1125–
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202 State evidence codes have provisions that are analogous or identical to Rule 401. Compare  FED. R. 
EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence; and(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”), with  CAL. 
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to expert evidence that is more restrictive than the federal standard, excluding 
otherwise-relevant evidence if it has not gained “general acceptance” within the 
relevant expert community.203  This general acceptance standard, first articulated in 
Frye v. United States nearly a century ago,204 remains in use to some degree in many 
states.205  Different states, however, apply Frye somewhat differently:  Some adhere to 
Frye strictly, while others merely consider general acceptance as one factor in the 
admissibility determination.  In many states that ostensibly follow Frye, judges engage 
in a broader reliability inquiry similar to the inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702.206 
To determine whether expert evidence has gained general acceptance under Frye 
or a Frye-like test, courts principally look at whether the evidence itself or the 
techniques and methods from which it is derived have achieved particular status in the 
relevant expert community.  Courts may look at whether the evidence is considered 
uncontroversial within the research field, or whether the evidence or methods on which 
it is based appear in textbooks and major treatises.  This inquiry is significantly more 
conservative than under the federal rule, because scientific and medical consensus can 
take decades to achieve, if consensus emerges at all.  Additionally, the Frye test 
provides a different role for the judge:  Under the federal rule, the judge must determine 
the reliability of expert evidence; under Frye, the judge must delegate that 
                                                                                                                                          
EVID. CODE § 210 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of 
a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action.”), and People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777 (1988) 
(explaining that New York follows relevancy rules similar to Federal Rule 401, without a codified 
evidence code), and TEX. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). 
203 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
204 Id. 
205 States still following Frye include: California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994); Illinois v. Miller, 
620 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996); State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 952, 955 (Kan. 2000); Burral v. Maryland, 
724 A.2d 65 (Md.1999); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 
596 (N.J. 1997); New York v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333 (N.Y. 1996); Pennsylvania v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 
162 (Pa. 1999); Washington v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996). 
206 Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility 
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (2005) (“ [I]n criminal cases, the adoption of the Daubert test, 
whether in state or federal court, had no statistically significant effect on admission.”). 
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determination to experts in the field by establishing whether they would find the 
evidence acceptable. 
3. SSA Administrative Proceedings 
In administrative proceedings, the administrative law judge (ALJ) is both trier of 
law and finder of fact, much like a state or federal judge in a bench trial.207  All agency 
proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).208  The APA 
authorizes agencies to take evidence in their proceedings; yet, it does not provide rules 
of evidence.  Instead, agencies promulgate their own evidentiary rules and practices.  
This short section focuses exclusively on the evidentiary rules and procedures of the 
Social Security Administration because of that agency’s role in adjudicating disability 
claims.   
In SSA disability determinations, ALJs’ evidentiary determinations are 
governed by a flexible, general standard rather than by a code equivalent to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.209  Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states that the claimant has “the right 
to appear and present evidence,”210 and that “[t]he administrative law judge may receive 
any evidence at the hearing that he or she believes relates to your claim.”211  Section 
405.331 of the same title instructs the claimant to “submit with your request for hearing 
any evidence that you have available to you.”212  Evidence “must be complete and 
detailed enough” for an adjudicator to determine the existence of the disability and its 
duration and severity.213  Additionally, Section 405.1(c)(2) states that the SSA “also 
will consider any relevant information that we have in our records.”214   
                                                
207 Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) states that “[a]ll adjudicators … have the authority to find facts and, if 
appropriate, to conduct a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with section 205(b) of the Act.” 
208 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).   
209 Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) sets forth the SSA’s “procedures for adjudicating the disability portion 
of initial claims for entitlement to benefits based on disability under title II of the Social Security Act. . . 
.” 
210 20 C.F.R. §  405.350(a) (2013). 
211 § 405.350(b). 
212 20 C.F.R. § 405.331(a) (2013). 
213 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e) (2013) (OASDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(e) (2013) (SSI).   
214 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2) (2013). 
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Beyond these very general evidentiary provisions set forth in the federal 
regulations, the SSA has promulgated guidance for claimants in its Bluebook.  The 
Bluebook instructs claimants that a disability claim requires medical evidence from 
treating physicians,215 but that the SSA also accepts and reviews medical evidence from 
other “acceptable medical source[s].”216  An “acceptable medical source” includes a 
“nonexamining source,” meaning a “physician, psychologist, or other acceptable 
medical source who has not examined you but provides a medical or other opinion in 
your case.”217  The Bluebook indicates in broad terms the kinds of expert evidence that 
a claimant may submit.  Yet, unlike the federal and state rules, it does not establish any 
criteria relating to the quality of the expert evidence.  These provisions constitute the 
entirety of the SSA regulations concerning the admissibility of evidence in disability 
proceedings, a stark contrast to the detailed federal and state rules of evidence and all 
their resulting interpretive case law.   
4. Common Features of These Regimes: Relevance and Reliability 
Despite the formal differences between these regimes, 218  evidence 
determinations under all of these regimes share a common foundation:  They are 
grounded in relevance; and, to varying extents, they require reliability and helpfulness 
to the finder of fact.219  Because of these similarities, the admissibility of neuroimaging 
evidence ought to be substantially similar in federal, state, and administrative 
proceedings. 
All of these regimes depart from the presumption that all relevant evidence is 
admissible. Federal and state practice, although balanced in favor of the admissibility of 
all relevant evidence under Rule 401, do permit some relevant evidence to be excluded: 
Relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or has the 
                                                
215 Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part II - Evidentiary Requirements, SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION , available at http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm 
(last visited March 3, 2014). 
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217 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (2013). 
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adversarial.” 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(1) (2013). 
219 William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 NYLS L. REV. 829, 
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tendency to mislead or confuse the jury.220  Relevant evidence also may be excluded if 
it constitutes impermissible hearsay or if it violates constitutional requirements, like the 
right of confrontation.221  The SSA regime admits relevant evidence more liberally, as it 
has no special exclusions equivalent to the federal and state exclusionary rules.222 
Finally, the regulations impose an affirmative obligation on the SSA to search its own 
records for any relevant evidence and to bring such evidence forward in a proceeding.223   
Federal and state evidence law specify criteria designed to assist the judge in 
determining whether proffered expert evidence is reliable.  The SSA regime appears to 
differ from the federal and state rules in that it does not set forth criteria for evaluating 
the reliability of expert evidence.  Yet it, too, implicitly contains a reliability 
requirement:  Evidence that is not at reliable cannot be relevant, since that which is 
false, misleading or of indeterminate reliability cannot aid the search for truth.  
Beyond relevance and reliability, to the extent that those criteria differ, federal 
and state rules also limit expert evidence to that which is “helpful to the trier of fact” by 
informing them on subjects outside of jurors’ ordinary competence. 224  As with 
reliability, the SSA standard appears to be silent on this point yet implicitly mirrors the 
federal and state rules.  Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states in the conditional form that the 
“[t]he administrative law judge may receive any evidence … that he or she believes 
relates to your claim.”225  Since the judge is vested with discretion to determine what 
relevant evidence to include or exclude, this suggests he or she may determine which 
evidence will help to adjudicate the claim. 
                                                
220 FED. R. EVID. 403; see also, e.g., MD. R. 5-403 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (2013); WIS. STAT. 
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The broad similarity between these three evidence regimes argues that expert 
neuroscientific evidence, including evidence derived from pain neuroimaging, ought to 
be similarly admissible in federal, state, and SSA proceedings.  States that follow Frye 
closely will apply the most restrictive standard.  Yet, rigorous pain neuroimaging 
evidence offered for aggregate or educative purposes ought to pass even the Frye test in 
many cases.  
Although there are differences between evidence regimes that will lead to 
admissibility differences at the margin, under all three regimes aggregate neuroimaging 
evidence of chronic pain ought to be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose.  The 
following section will propose use-cases in which pain neuroimaging could be relevant 
and in which it likely ought to be admissible under each evidence regime.  It also sets 
forth the case for why neuroimaging currently ought to be admissible only for aggregate 
purposes, while pointing to a future in which scans of individual claimants may be 
sufficiently rigorous to merit admission. 
B. Recommendations on the Admissibility of Pain Neuroimaging Evidence 
This Section first proposes the major categories in which neuroscience-based 
evidence about chronic pain conditions may be relevant.  It then suggests what kinds of 
neuroscience evidence may be sufficiently reliability to gain admissibility under all 
three evidence regimes, and what kinds of evidence, or what claims relative to chronic 
pain neuroscience evidence, may not be sufficiently reliable to pass one or more of the 
federal, state, and SSA evidentiary thresholds.  This focus on relevance first, and then 
reliability, mirrors the architecture of the Federal Rules, whose drafters logically 
suggested that relevance precedes all other considerations.  
1. Pain Neuroimaging Is Sufficiently Reliable to Be Admitted for Some Purposes  
Pain neuroimaging evidence should be admissible in certain cases to help the 
finder of fact understand the nature of chronic pain diseases, to demonstrate general 
features of chronic pain diseases, and to show the average impact of such diseases on 
the neurological function of sufferers.  Testimony grounded in structural and functional 
neuroimaging of chronic pain, when offered for these limited purposes, should satisfy 
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the federal Daubert and state Frye standards (with some exceptions), as well as the 
more permissive relevance and reliability standards in SSA proceedings.   
There are several strong uses-cases for aggregate neuroimaging evidence in 
cases where chronic pain is at issue, all of which fall into the category of expert-as-
educator.  Neuroscience-based evidence relating to chronic pain could offered as 
relevant to matters within the following three general categories: (a) the biology of 
chronic pain; (b) the cognitive and affective effects and implications of chronic pain; 
and (c) general debiasing, that is, correcting implicit biases or mistaken inferences 
adjudicators or jurors may draw from their own experience.  Given the nearly limitless 
variety of facts in the world, and advocates’ creativity in working with them, though, 
these categories do not capture all potentially relevant uses of such evidence.  The 
arguments in this section draw on and incorporate the scientific material presented in 
Part II, supra; accordingly, the supporting research is not repeated here. 
a. Relevance Case: General Biology of Chronic Pain 
Evidence grounded in neuroimaging, including brain images themselves, could 
help explain to ALJs and to jurors features of chronic pain that may be puzzling or 
counterintuitive to the non-expert.  There are four major concepts about chronic pain 
that decision-makers should because they may be important to adjudicating a case.  
These four concepts are outside of the experience of lay jurors and ALJs; indeed, they 
likely are outside the experience even of physicians who do not practice in the chronic 
pain area.  These concepts track those introduced in Part III.C, concerning the role of 
neuroimaging in changing norms, but here are not limited to disability and apply to any 
case involving chronic pain claims.  
First, experts may inform decision-makers about how brain-based processes 
modulate pain experience, so that two different individuals with the same or similar 
peripheral injury may experience markedly different degrees and durations of pain.226 
Such evidence would go to explaining the “excess” pain that some individuals 
experience.  Evidence of central sensitization can also aid decision-makers in 
                                                
226 See supra Part II.A. 
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understanding how pain may persist after the apparent resolution of the original injury 
or disease.227 
Second, brain-based processes can cause a pain condition even in the absence of 
a discernable peripheral injury, that is, “pain without lesion.”228  The existence of this 
kind of pain is the most counter-intuitive to non-specialists and may be likely to be 
adjudged as fraudulent or as a form of factitious disorder.229  Expert testimony can 
explain the neurological mechanisms that give rise to such pain.  It can also help 
construct a clinically realistic portrait of these kinds of diseases to aid the decision-
maker in coming to an accurate assessment of a particular claimant or plaintiff.  
Third, although all chronic pain conditions will share some neurological features, 
distinct chronic pain conditions present distinct patterns of brain involvement.230  
Evidence on this point can aid decision-makers in understanding the reality of pain 
conditions.  If an opposing party introduces testimony to the effect that certain pain 
conditions, like fibromyalgia or chronic headache, lack a biological basis, rebuttal 
testimony about the specific neurobiology of such conditions would become relevant. 
Finally, chronic pain results in structural remodeling of the brain, although 
permanence or reversibility of these changes remain under investigation.  Testimony on 
the degree and duration of impairment could go to damages in a tort case.  
b. Relevance Case: Cognitive and Affective Effects of Chronic Pain 
Findings from neuroimaging, along with more traditional kinds of evidence, can 
help instruct the finder of fact about the cognitive and emotional impacts of chronic 
pain.  These impacts are not ephemeral nor epiphenomenal:  They are part of the pain 
disorder. 231   Cognitive and affective issues arise directly from the brain-based 
impairments of chronic pain conditions.232  Pain neuroimaging and related research 
show how specific cognitive and affective regions of the brain involved in pain 
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processing become functionally and structurally altered by pain.  As discussed infra, in 
Part III.B., research suggests that, when a chronic pain sufferer and a typical person 
perform the same task in the lab, the pain sufferer needs to recruit different and 
additional brain regions to do the same work; the total “load” becomes higher for him or 
her.  By analogy, chronic pain impairs performance on a decision task similarly to how 
texting interferes with driving.  The difference is that the chronic pain sufferer cannot 
“put down the phone.”  
Cognitive impairments may affect a claimant’s ability to work at the pre-illness 
cognitive level.  The affective impairments may constitute a compensable harm in tort, 
as part of the overall evaluation of damages.  Affective impairments also go to the 
question of hedonic adaptability.233  Unlike many other forms of disability, chronic pain 
is unfortunately non-adaptable: The famous behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who had 
an accident that left him with third-degree burns over most of his body, has written 
eloquently about the non-adaptability of chronic pain.234  The reasons for pain’s low 
hedonic adaptability are multiple, including that pain hurts!  Neuroimaging revealing 
how pain commandeers portions of the brain’s emotional systems may provide an 
additional explanation:  Mood cannot fully recover where the condition itself interferes 
with mood regulation.  This could be relevant in a tort case to show future damages or 
to rebut a defense argument for limited damages grounded in hedonic adaptability.  
c. Relevance Case: Debiasing  
The experience of at least some degree of pain is universal.  Pain thus would 
seem to be within the knowledge and experience of the ordinary juror.  However, this 
very experience may mislead jurors.  Chronic pain is not like acute pain.  Jurors who 
have experienced acute pain thus may reason wrongly about chronic pain specifically 
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because of they are likely to try to understand chronic pain based on their own 
experience of acute pain.  This creates a role for the expert witness as an educator about 
the nature of this misunderstood set of conditions. 
Courts have been mixed in their reception of experts as pure educators, as in the 
case of experts who testify about the fallibility of eyewitness identification.235  Some 
courts have permitted experts to teach the jury about the fallibility of eyewitnesses, 
reasoning that such testimony is necessary to debias jurors who otherwise will give too 
much weight to eyewitness identification evidence. 236   Other courts have held, 
conversely, that scientific evidence concerning visual recall and identification is not a 
proper subject for expert testimony because it is within the ordinary experience of 
jurors.237   
Testimony educating the jury about general features of chronic pain or specific 
chronic pain conditions could face similar skepticism among courts.  However, expert 
testimony about chronic pain is readily distinguishable from education about visual 
identification and recall.  Although, as with visual recall, every juror will have had 
experience with pain, most will not have had experience with serious chronic pain.  This 
places chronic pain further outside the scope of juror competence than eyewitness 
identification.  If the jury does contain a member who has had serious chronic pain, it 
would be more appropriate for the rest of the jury to be educated by parties’ experts 
than for there to be, in effect, a covert expert in the jury room who has not been subject 
to adversarial examination.   
2. Neuroimaging Should Not (Yet?) Be Admissible to Prove Individual Pain  
Neuroimaging techniques, particularly fMRI, should not be admissible at this 
point under federal or state standards to prove or disprove the presence of a chronic pain 
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condition in any individual.  The major concerns that render such evidence currently 
inadmissible are identical to those that must be resolved in order to allow for future 
admissibility.  Moreover, these problems currently are common to all individual, non-
aggregate evidentiary uses of all fMRI and much structural brain imaging, not just the 
neuroimaging of chronic pain.  These are, in this author’s view, the problems of: 
baseline norming;238 reverse inference problems; 239 inter- and intra-subject variation; 240 
high cost; 241 and counter-measures (“tricking the scanner”).242 .  Each of these problems 
relating to the validity of scans for individual pain diagnosis is scientifically nontrivial.  
However, the breathtaking pace of innovation in neuroscience and in information 
processing would make it foolhardy to say “never.”   
Even if future neuroimaging protocols reduce the risk of these interpretive 
pitfalls, the legal system still should not develop a default expectation that parties 
introduce such evidence in all chronic pain cases.  Such evidence is costly relative to 
other evidence that might adequately resolve the case.  A preference for scans might 
prejudice decision-makers against claimants who cannot afford the technique or whose 
condition cannot reliably be discerned that way.  This could create a CSI effect, wherein 
jurors or adjudicators expect a party to produce a type of scientific evidence simply 
because it exists,243 and draw an adverse inference against the party if such evidence is 
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not offered.244  Currently and in the foreseeable future, it would be undesirable for 
scientific, economic, and normative reasons for adjudicators and fact finders to develop 
an expectation that neuroimaging should be introduced to prove pain.   
CONCLUSION 
At the same time that chronic pain is pervasive across important areas of law, 
the law incorporates deep bias and confusion about what chronic pain consists of and 
even whether it is “real.”  Generations of patients and courtroom claimants with chronic 
pain have been told that their condition is “all in their heads.”  Although the medical 
establishment is changing rapidly in light of new pain science, legal actors still 
frequently dismiss people who complain of chronic pain as “head cases.”  Legal 
doctrines, including judge-made law interpreting the Social Security Disability 
regulations, encode these pejorative characterizations, which are grounded in part in 
skepticism about pain, an invisible and largely unverifiable condition, and in part in a 
Freudian-inflected construction of the chronic pain sufferer as the modern-day hysteric. 
Although not providing a pain-o-meter that will separate the honest pain sufferer 
from the malingering fraudster, neuroimaging and other technologies can play a positive 
role in helping to change norms, to inform interpretation of existing laws and 
regulations, and contribute to establishing new legal standards.  These technologies may 
never produce definitive measurements of pain its and associated distress.  And, they 
may never surmount the problem of pain’s incommensurability across subjects.  Yet, 
they can shed light on mechanisms of pain chronification, the biological correlates of 
chronic pain, and the neurological bases of chronic pain without lesion.  This should 
allow fact-finders and decision-makers to recognize chronic pain in the courtroom, 
should allow judges to better interpret administrative regulations relating to chronic 
pain, and should lead to the revision of the Social Security Disability regulations to 
provide greater guidance on when a person may be disabled by chronic pain. 
The ability to partially measure and objectify pain both will and will not resolve 
difficult legal questions that turn on pain’s presence and intensity in individual cases.  
This is because, even if neuroimaging could validate pain’s presence and severity 
perfectly, legal actors still would need to determine when pain, and what kinds of pain, 
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constitute a legally-redressable impairment.  As neuroimaging develops, the law will 
confront ever more challenging questions in this regard, such as whether it can sustain 
its different treatment of physical and emotional pain, which also has neurological 
correlates.  Indeed, pain may be the phenomenon that requires law to rethink or even 
abandon its current dualism between physical and emotional harms.  Neuroimaging 
seems technical, and is technological.  But in providing a window into the brain and the 
subjective experiences the brain generates, it challenges existing norms about many 
categories of subjective phenomena and goes to the theoretical heart of legal doctrines 
about body and mind. 
